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ARTICLE

Prosecuting the Crime of Aggression in the International
Criminal Court
Johan D. van der Vyver
ABSTRACT
The crime of aggression was included in the subject‐matter jurisdiction of
the International Criminal Court (ICC) (Article 5(1)(d) of the ICC Statute), but the
competence of the ICC to prosecute aggression was made subject to the
adoption of a definition of the crime and of the circumstances under which the
ICC could exercise jurisdiction (Article 5(2)). Following years of intensive
deliberations, the matter was finally settled by a Review Conference of the
International Criminal Court that was held in Kampala, Uganda on May 31
through June 11, 2010.
The crime of aggression committed by an individual is based on an act of
aggression committed by a State. The definition of an act of aggression
approved by general agreement in Kampala simply repeats the provisions of
General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of December 14, 1974, that was
initially designed as a guide for the Security Council when exercising its Chapter
VII powers to counteract a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act
of aggression. The crime of aggression was defined in Kampala, again by general
agreement, as “the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in
a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military
action which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation
of the Charter of the United Nations.” The crime of aggression thus came to be
defined as (a) a leadership crime; (b) flowing forth from an act of aggression; and
(c) subject to U.N. Charter constraints. The definition furthermore followed the
“differentiated approach” whereby the means of perpetration and the element
of mens rea are not included in the definition but are dealt with separately in
other sections of the ICC Statute (Articles 25(3) and 30, respectively). In virtue of
the fact that aggression is a leadership crime, perpetration as an accessory
(Article 25(3)(c)), attempt to commit the crime (Article 25(3)(d)), and vicarious
liability for a crime committed by others (Article 28), will not be feasible in cases
of aggression.
 I.T. Cohen Professor of International Law and Human Rights, Emory University School
of Law; Extraordinary Professor in the Department of Private Law, University of Pretoria.
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More difficult, though, was reaching general agreement on the
circumstances under which the ICC can prosecute the crime of aggression; in
particular the role to be afforded to the Security Council. It was decided in
Kampala to deal separately with instances where investigations were triggered
by State Party referrals or by the Prosecutor acting proprio motu on the one
hand (Article 15bis), and by a Security Council referral on the other (Article
15ter). In the case of State Party referrals and investigations proprio motu, the
Prosecutor must first establish whether the Security Council has made a
determination of an act of aggression. If it has, the Prosecutor may proceed with
the investigation; if it has not done so within a period of six months after having
been notified by the Prosecutor, a Pre‐Trial Chamber of the ICC may authorize
the investigation to proceed. In the case of Security Council referrals, the
Prosecutor may proceed with an investigation into the commission of the crime
of aggression without further ado. In both instances, a determination of an act of
aggression by the Security Council is not binding to the ICC’s own finding in this
regard.
In the case of State Party referrals and investigations proprio motu, the
crime of aggression cannot be prosecuted in the ICC (a) if the State guilty of the
act of aggression is not a State Party to the ICC Statute, in which event the ICC
cannot exercise its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression committed by a
national or on the territory on the non‐party State; or (b) if the State concerned,
being a State Party, has submitted a prior declaration to the Registrar of the ICC
that it does not accept the jurisdiction of the ICC over the crime of aggression.
These constraints do not apply in the case of Security Council referrals.
The amendments to the ICC Statute approved by the Review Conference
will enter into force following ratification of the amendments by no less than
thirty States Parties. Furthermore, implementation of the decisions taken in
Kampala in respect of the crime of aggression will be kept on ice until at least
January 1, 2017, after which a decision to implement the same must again be
approved by the same majority of States Parties required for amendments of the
ICC Statute. Although this outcome is in a sense disappointing, the fact that
nations of the world have now agreed on a definition of aggression will most
likely serve as a deterrent against unbecoming military action by trigger‐happy
regimes.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Including aggression in the subject‐matter jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court (ICC) has been highly controversial since day one of the
negotiations that culminated in adoption of the Statute of the International
Criminal Court (ICC Statute) by the Rome Diplomatic Conference of
Plenipotentiaries in 1998.1 Two contentious issues precluded the Rome
Conference from reaching agreement on the crime of aggression: (a) how to
translate what was essentially an act of state into individual liability; and (b) the
role to be afforded to the Security Council of the United Nations as a filter for
prosecutions of the crime of aggression in the ICC.2
In attempting to come to terms with the first of these two issues, a
distinction was made in the course of the debate between acts of aggression
committed by States and the crime of aggression committed by individuals
responsible for authorizing or instigating an act of aggression.3 The ICC can only
prosecute individuals suspected of committing the crime of aggression.4 The
major difficulty remained, though, in finding a proper criterion for designating
the person or persons who should be held criminally responsible for an act of
aggression of the culprit State.
There were in essence two definitions of aggression to go by: (a) General
Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, dealing with acts of
aggression,5 and (b) the one contained in the (Nuremberg) Charter of the
International Military Tribunal, which dealt with the crime against peace (as it was
then called) committed by natural persons (individuals in Anglo‐American legal
usage).6
Resolution 3314 was intended to serve as a guide for the Security Council
for purposes of executing its Chapter VII powers with regard to acts of
1

See Noah Weisbord, Comment, Prosecuting Aggression, 49 HARV. INT'L L.J. 161, 170–71
(2008) (discussing the issues faced at the Rome Conference in defining a “crime of
aggression”).
2
See Silvia A. Fernández de Gurmendi, The Working Group on Aggression at the
Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 589,
590 (2002) (identifying the two main issues regarding the crime of aggression as “the
definition of the crime and the conditions of exercise of jurisdiction by the Court”).
3
Id. at 597.
4
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 25(1), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9
(July 17, 1998), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 1002, at 1016 (1998) [hereinafter ICC Statute].
5
G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, U.N. Doc. A/9631, at 142
(Dec. 14, 1974) [hereinafter G.A. Res. 3314].
6
Charter of the International Military Tribunal, art. 6(a), Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82
U.N.T.S. 279, reprinted in 39 AM. J. INT’L L. 257 (1945) [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter].
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aggression.7 It defines aggression as the use of armed force by a State against
the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State,
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as
set out in this definition, and then goes on to list a number of acts that
constitute acts of aggression.8 The Charter of the International Military Tribunal
defined crimes against peace as a planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a
war of aggression or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or
assurances, or participation in a Common Plan or Conspiracy for the
accomplishment of any of the foregoing.9 Attempts at the Rome Conference to
reach agreement on the definition of aggression based on these two precedents
were not successful. Many delegations did not want to leave it at that. Because
the Nuremberg Tribunal prosecuted crimes against peace, it was generally felt
that excluding aggression from the jurisdiction of the ICC would be a step
backwards.10
As to the second major problem mentioned above, several delegations,
mainly those representing the Permanent Members of the Security Council (P5),
argued that dealing with acts of aggression was a prerogative of the Security
Council of the United Nations and for that reason ought not to lead to
prosecutions in an international criminal court.11 They relied on Article 39 of the
U.N. Charter, which provides in part: “The Security Council shall determine the
existence of any . . . act of aggression.”12 Other delegations, referring to Article
24 of the U.N. Charter, maintained that the Security Council has been entrusted
with a primary responsibility, and not an exclusive responsibility, to take action
against States engaged in acts of aggression.13 The fact that decisions of the
7

See G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 5, at 143, art. 1 (stating that the definition should be
used “as guidance in determining, in accordance with the Charter, the existence of an
act of aggression”).
8
Id. at 143, art. 3.
9
Nuremberg Charter, supra note 6.
10
Herman von Hebel & Daryl Robinson, Crimes within the Jurisdiction of the Court, in THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE: ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS,
RESULTS 79, 82 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999); Elise Leclerc‐Cagné & Michael Byers, A Question of
Intent: The Crime of Aggression and Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention, 41 CASE W.
RES. J. INT’L L. 379, 381 (2009); Matthias Schuster, The Rome Statute and the Crime of
Aggression: A Cordian Knot in Search of a Sword, 14 CRIM. L. F. 1, 9 (2003).
11
See von Hebel & Robinson, supra note 10, at 82 (noting that the P5 supported a
provision that called for the Security Council to make a determination of whether an act
of aggression has been committed before the Court would be able to step in).
12
U.N. Charter art. 39, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 1043, T.S./U.N. No. 993; 1976
U.N.Y.B. 1043, 1046, U.N. Sales No. DPI511 [hereinafter U.N. Charter]; Fernández de
Gurmendi, supra note 2, at 601–602.
13
U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 1 (“Members confer on the Security Council primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security . . . .”); see also
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Security Council are almost exclusively based on political rather than juridical
considerations prompted many delegations—indeed a vast majority—to oppose
the granting of a decisive role to the Security Council in prosecutions in the ICC
for the crime of aggression.14
The crime of aggression was eventually included in the subject‐matter
jurisdiction of the ICC,15 but the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC to prosecute
the crime of aggression was made conditional upon the adoption of a provision
defining the crime and stipulating the conditions under which the ICC would be
competent to exercise jurisdiction over that crime.16 In its closing plenary
session of July 17, 1998, the Rome Conference adopted Resolution F, establishing
a Preparatory Commission and instructing the Commission to prepare proposals
in regard to the crime of aggression, including its definition and elements, and
the conditions under which the ICC could exercise jurisdiction in regard to that
crime.17 Resolution F went on to provide: “The Commission shall submit such
proposals to the Assembly of States Parties at a Review Conference, with a view
to arriving at an acceptable provision on the crime of aggression for inclusion in
this Statute.”18 Article 121 of the ICC Statute placed an embargo on the
amendment of the ICC Statute for a period of seven years from the date upon
which the ICC Statute entered into force,19 which happened on July 1, 2002.
Following the seven years period, a Review Conference had to be convened to
deal with proposed amendments to the ICC Statute “if the issue involved so
warrants.”20 The judgment of the Rome Conference as reflected in Resolution F
was clearly that inclusion of a definition of the crime of aggression in the ICC
Statute and specifying the circumstances under which the ICC can exercise
jurisdiction over that crime “so warrants.” The ICC Statute furthermore
stipulated that “a provision . . . defining the crime [of aggression] and setting out
the conditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to
Carrie McDougal, When Law and Reality Clash—The Imperative of Compromise in the
Context of the Accumulated Evil of the Whole: Conditions for the Exercise of the
International Criminal Court‘s Jurisdiction over the Crime of Aggression, 7 INT’L CRIM. L.
REV. 277, 287 (2005) (noting that the ICJ has stated that the responsibility granted by
Article 24 is primary rather than exclusive).
14
See infra notes 155, 156.
15
ICC Statute, supra note 4, art. 5(1)(d).
16
Id. art. 5(2); cf. Ruth Wedgwood, The International Criminal Court: An American View,
10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 93, 105 (1999) (noting, with skepticism, that aggression was included in
the ICC Statute “as an empty category”).
17
Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, It., July 15–17, 1998, Resolution
F, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/L.76/Add.14 (July 16, 1998).
18
Id.
19
ICC Statute, supra note 4, art. 121(1).
20
Id. art. 121(2).
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the crime” must be “adopted in accordance with articles 121 and 123.”21 Article
121 lays down procedural requirements for amending the ICC Statute, and
Article 123 makes provision for the initial and subsequent review conferences.22
At its Eighth Session, the Assembly of States Parties of the International
Criminal Court decided that the Review Conference would be held in Kampala,
Uganda from May 31 to June 11, 2010 for a period of ten working days.23 The
Review Conference accomplished its mission—more or less—in its final session
that commenced on June 11 and continued after midnight into the early hours of
the following day.24 The decisions were adopted by general agreement.25 It is
important to note that “general agreement” was not confined to States Parties
to the ICC Statute. Non‐party States (and member organizations of the NGO
Coalition for the International Criminal Court) participated in the formal
discussions and informal deliberations.26 “General agreement” was based on
compromises between all the participating States.27 Those compromises
reflected, at times, the preferences of a small minority, of which non‐party
States in some instances constituted a decisive component.28
The final outcome of the Review Conference was neatly encapsulated by
Ambassador Stephen Rapp and Prof. Harold Koh, the leading figures in the (18
members strong) American delegation, in their report back to the Department of
State on U.S. re‐engagement with the ICC and the outcome of the Review
Conference:
21

Id. art. 5(2).
Id. arts. 121, 123.
23
Rep. of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the Int’l Criminal Court,
8th Sess., Nov. 18–26, 2009, ¶ 44, U.N. Doc. ICC‐ASP/8/20 (2009).
24
See Claus Kreß & Leonie von Holtzendorff, The Kampala Compromise on the Crime of
Aggressionz, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1179, 1180 (Nov. 2010) (explaining that the clocks were
stopped at midnight to allow conference deliberations to continue).
25
See ICC, Resolutions and Declarations Adopted by the Review Conference, Review
Conf. Res. RC/Res.1–6, ICC Doc. ICC‐ASP‐RC/11, at pt. II (June 8–11, 2010) (listing the
resolutions adopted by “consensus”).
26
Id. at pt. IA, ¶¶ 4–6.
27
See Amal Alamuddin & Philippa Webb, Expanding Jurisdiction Over War Crimes Under
Article Eight Of The ICC Statute, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1219, 1225 (Nov. 2010) (discussing a
compromise that took place in order to reach a consensus); see also Michael P. Scharf, A
Tribute to Henry King, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 621, 624 (Spring 2010) (calling the
agreement reached an “elaborate compromise”).
28
See Comment on the Review Conference of the Rome Statute, INTERNATIONAL LAW
OBSERVER (July 6, 2010), http://internationallawobserver.eu/2010/07/06/comment‐on‐
the‐review‐conference‐of‐the‐rome‐statute/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2011) (noting the
influence of the non‐party States and the influence of China, Russia, and the United
States).
22
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The court cannot exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression
without a further decision to take place sometime after January 1st,
2017. The prosecutor cannot charge nationals of non‐state parties,
including the U.S. nationals, with the crime of aggression. No U.S.
national can be prosecuted for aggression as long as the U.S. remains a
non‐state party. And if we were to become a state party, we’d still have
the option to opt out from having our nationals prosecuted for
aggression. So we ensure total protection for our Armed Forces and
other U.S. nationals going forward.29

This article explores, by way of introduction in Section A, the proceedings
that preceded the Review Conference. The main focus of the essay, though, will
be on the Review Conference itself, with emphasis on the primary controversies
that had to be resolved in Kampala.
Least of those, perhaps, were reaching agreement on a definition of the
crime of aggression, dealt with in Section B of this article. The significance of (a)
aggression as a leadership crime, (b) based on an act of aggression, and (c)
subject to U.N. Charter constraints, will be explained in some detail, and special
attention is also given to (d) the structuring of the definition according to the so‐
called “differentiated approach” that excludes from the definition references to
elements of the crime relating to the means of perpetration and mens rea. Of
special interest in the latter context is the question whether the means of
perpetration that applies to accomplices in the commission of a crime (Article
25(3)), or vicarious liability of persons in authority (Article 28), or the defense of
superior orders (Article 33), are also applicable to the crime of aggression.
The conditions under which the ICC can exercise jurisdiction over the
crime of aggression, which is the topic discussed in Section C, remained a
stumbling block in the pursuit of consensus right to the end. The debate
remained centered on (a) designating an appropriate filter for an investigation
into the crime of aggression to proceed (who will decide that an act of
aggression has been committed?); (b) differentiating between the rules that will
apply in the case of State Party referrals and investigations by the Prosecutor
proprio motu on the one hand, and Security Council referrals on the other; (c)
conditions that must be satisfied for the entering into force of the decisions of
the Review Conference, and in particular those applying to the power of the ICC
to prosecute crimes of aggression; and (d) the competence of States to preclude
the exercise of jurisdiction over crimes of aggression deriving from acts of
aggression committed by the State concerned or by any of its nationals.
29

U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, U.S. ENGAGEMENT WITH THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE
OUTCOME OF THE RECENTLY CONCLUDED REVIEW CONFERENCE (June 15, 2010) (statement by
Mr. Koh).
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The articles pertinent to the crime of aggression that was added to the
ICC Statute by the Review Conference are cited and briefly analyzed in Section D
of the article, followed by some concluding observations.
II. FROM ROME TO KAMPALA
Post‐Rome proceedings relating to the crime of aggression occurred in
two stages.30 In the period 1998–2002 (prior to the entry into force of the ICC
Statute) a Working Group of the post‐Rome Preparatory Commission considered
the matters relevant to the crime of aggression.31 The Working Group was
initially coordinated by Tuvako Monongi of Tanzania, and subsequently by Silvia
Fernández de Gurmendi of Argentina.32 Since the definition of aggression and
the conditions under which it can be prosecuted in the ICC could not be
incorporated into the ICC Statute before, at the earliest, 1 July 2009,33
deliberations in the Preparatory Commission were stifled by the absence of a
sense of urgency.34 Delegations seemed reluctant to commit themselves to a
definition and requirements that would only become effective after the lapse of
several years.
In January 2002, the Secretariat of the Preparatory Commission published
a useful and informative review of historical developments relating to aggression
in which it recorded elaborate details of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials,
Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, and judgments of the
International Court of Justice (ICJ), pertaining to aggression.35 Progress made,
and controversies that persisted, while the matter was considered by the
30

Rep. of the Preparatory Comm’n for the Int’l Criminal Court, 2d Sess., July 26–Aug. 13,
1999, Summary ¶ 8(a), U.N. Doc. PCNICC/1999/L.4/Rev.1 (Aug. 18, 1999); see Fernández
de Gurmendi, supra note 2, at 589–90 (explaining why the Preparatory Commission
established the Working Group).
31
Fernández de Gurmendi, supra note 2, at 589–90.
32
See Fernández de Gurmendi, supra note 2, for a general overview of the work of the
Working Group.
33
See Alain Pellet, Entry into Force and Amendment of the Statute, in 1 THE ROME STATUTE
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 145, 183 (Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta & John
R.W.D. Jones eds., Iain L. Fraser trans., 2002) (finding this arrangement “surprising,”
because the life‐span of the Preparatory Commission would terminate when the
Assembly of States Parties holds its first meeting and a definition was therefore
expected to be found many years before it could actually be enacted into the ICC
Statute).
34
Schuster, supra note 10, at 17.
35
Historical Review of Developments Relating to Aggression, Preparatory Comm'n for
the Int'l Criminal Court, 9th Sess., Apr. 8–9, 2002, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2002/WGCA/L.1
(Sep. 9, 2003).
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Preparatory Commission are reflected in a proposal of the Commission “for a
provision on the crime of aggression” contained in the report of its final meeting
that was held in New York in July 2002.36 That report merely incorporated the
final Discussion Paper Proposed by the Coordinator of July 11, 2002.37 The
Discussion Paper contained the following general definition of the crime of
aggression:
For the purpose of the present Statute, a person commits a “crime of
aggression” when, being in a position effectively to exercise control over
or to direct the political or military action of a State, that person
intentionally and knowingly orders or participates actively in the
planning, preparation, initiation or execution of an act of aggression
which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a flagrant violation
of the Charter of the United Nations.38

Already at that stage, the proposed definition contained certain components
that finally came to be accepted by the Review Conference. The Working
Group’s definition—
(a) designated the person who commits the crime of aggression as someone
“in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political
or military action of the State”;39
(b) confined the actus reus to “the planning, preparation or execution of an
act of aggression”;40

36

Rep. of the Preparatory Comm’n for the Int’l Criminal Court, 10th Sess., July 1–12,
2002, pt. II, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2002/2/Add.2, add. (July 24, 2002).
37
See Discussion Paper Proposed by the Coordinator, Preparatory Comm’n for the Int’l
Criminal Court, 10th Sess., July 1–12, 2002, U.N. Doc.PCNICC/2002/WGCA/RT.1/Rev. 2
(July 11, 2002); see Roger S. Clark, Rethinking Aggression as a Crime and Formulating Its
Elements: The Final Work‐Product of the Preparatory Commission for the International
Criminal Court, 15 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 859, 872–86 (2002) (reviewing the Discussion Paper);
Noah Weisbord, supra note 1, at 173–76 (analyzing the Discussion Paper).
38
Discussion Paper Proposed by the Coordinator, supra note 37, ¶ I(1).
39
Id. ¶ II(1); see also Incorporating the Crime of Aggression as a Leadership Crime into
the Definition, Proposal Submitted by Belg., Cambodia, Sierra Leone & Thai.,
Preparatory Comm’n for the Int’l Criminal Court, 10th Sess., July 1–12, 2002, ¶ 2, U.N.
Doc. PCNICC/2002/WGCA/DP.5 (July 8, 2002) (adding the adverb “effectively” before
the words “exercise control” in order to reflect the principle that “the crime of
aggression is a leadership crime which may only be committed by persons who have
effective control of the State and military apparatus . . .”).
40
Discussion Paper Proposed by the Coordinator, supra note 37, ¶ II(3).
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(c) required that the act of aggression must “by its character, gravity and
scale, constitute[] a flagrant violation of the Charter of the United
Nations.”41
“Flagrant violation” of the Charter of the United Nations did eventually
become “manifest violation.”42
The Coordinator’s Discussion Paper proceeded on the assumption that
the means of perpetration stipulated in Article 25(3) of the ICC Statute, vicarious
liability of military commanders and other superiors as regulated by Article 28,
and the provisions of Article 33 designating circumstances under which superior
orders will or will not be an excuse, do not apply to the crime of aggression.43
Although these assumptions were not included in the final decision of the
Review Conference, they are nevertheless implicit in the definition adopted by
the Review Conference.
The definition that went forward to the next phase of its design
orchestrated by the Assembly of States Parties also contained elements, and
reflected controversies, that were eventually omitted. References in the
definition (a) to the means of perpetration (ordering or participating actively in
the conduct that constitutes an act of aggression), and (b) to the element of
mens rea (intentionally and knowingly executing the act that constitutes an act
of aggression), was in the end omitted from the definition in order to bring the
provisions relating to the crime of aggression into conformity with the general
structure of the ICC Statute which separated the definitions of crimes (Articles 5
to 8) from the means of perpetration (Article 25(3)) and the mental element
(Article 30).44
The Working Paper of the Coordinator furthermore reflected the opinion
of some delegations that wanted to limit the acts of aggression that could
constitute the basis of prosecutions for the crime of aggression to ones that
constitute (or amount to) a war of aggression, military occupation, or annexation

41

Id. ¶ I(7).
See Int’l Criminal Court [ICC], Rep. on the Informal Inter‐Sessional Meeting of the
Special Working. Grp. on the Crime of Aggression, transmitted by note of the
Secretariat, Assembly of State Parties, 5th Sess., Nov. 23–Dec. 1, 2006, ¶ 20, ICC Doc.
ICC‐ASP/5/SWGCA/INF.1 (Sept. 5, 2006) [hereinafter 5th Sess. Rep. on the Informal
Inter‐Sessional Meeting] (“A general preference was noted for the term ‘manifest’
rather than ‘flagrant’ if the qualifier was to be retained.”).
43
Id. ¶ 86; see also Clark, supra note 37, at 883–86 (arguing that, given the nature of the
crime of aggression, these general provisions do not fit the commission of that crime).
44
See Weisbord, supra note 1, at 192 (discussing how this approach would “retain the
consistency of the Rome Statute by treating aggression like the other crimes”).
42
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of the territory of another State—thereby eliminating several other instances of
acts of aggression mentioned in Resolution 3314.45
The provisions dealing with the conditions under which the ICC can
prosecute the crime of aggression remained controversial throughout the
Preparatory Commission’s life span. As noted by Silvia Fernández de Gurmendi,
the issues to be decided “raise not only thorny political difficulties, but also
technical problems that need to be addressed.”46 The main focus was on the
role of the Security Council.47 Different sets of options, and variants within the
confines of particular options, dealing particularly with instances where the
Security Council has not made a determination as to the existence of an act of
aggression by the State concerned, remained in contention.48 Some views
reflected in the labyrinth of options and variants sought to afford to the General
Assembly of the United Nations,49 or to the ICJ,50 the power to determine the
existence of an act of aggression for purposes of setting ICC prosecutions of a
crime of aggression in motion. It is fair to conclude that the Preparatory
Commission did not even come close to reaching agreement on the conditions
under which the ICC would be competent to prosecute the crime of aggression.
The Preparatory Commission did initiate the drafting of Elements of
Crimes for the crime of aggression, based on a proposal submitted by Samoa.51
45

Discussion Paper Proposed by the Coordinator, supra note 37, ¶ I(1)(Options 1 & 2).
Fernández de Gurmendi, supra note 2, at 605.
47
See id. at 599 (“The articulation of an adequate relationship with the Security Council
was one the most sensitive issues during the drafting of the Rome Statute.”).
48
See id. at 602 (discussing the Council’s inaction as an argument against the Council’s
exclusivity to determine an act of aggression); Weisbord, supra note 1, at 168–70
(noting the Council’s historical reticence in naming aggression).
49
Discussion Paper Proposed by the Coordinator, supra note 37, ¶ I(5)(Option 3).
50
Id. ¶ I(5)(Options 4 & 5). By virtue of its own Statute, the ICJ cannot simply decide
that an act of aggression has taken place. A Proposal submitted by Bosnia and
Herzegovina, New Zealand and Romania in 2001 was to the effect that if the Security
Council has not made a determination of an act of aggression, the ICC can invite the
General Assembly to request the ICJ for an advisory opinion regarding the commission
of an act of aggression. See Incorporating the Crime of Aggression as a Leadership
Crime into the Definition, Proposal Submitted by Bosnia & Herzegovina, New Zealand
and Rome, Preparatory Comm’n for the Int’l Criminal Court, 7th Sess., Feb. 26–Mar. 9,
2001, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2001/WGCA/DP.1 (Feb. 23, 2001); see also Proposal by the
Netherlands concerning PCNICC/2002/WGCA/RT.1, Preparatory Comm’n for the Int’l
Criminal Court, 9th Sess., Apr. 8–19, 2002, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2002/WGCA/DP.1 (Apr. 17,
2002) (proposing that “[t]he Court may request the Security Council . . . to seek an
advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice . . . on the legal question of
whether or not an act of aggression has been committed by the State concerned”).
51
Elements of the Crime of Aggression, Proposal Submitted by Samoa, Preparatory
Comm’n for the Int’l Criminal Court, 10th Sess., July 1–12, 2002, U.N. Doc.
46
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In the period 2002–2010, defining the crime of aggression and
determining the circumstances under which the ICC would be competent to
prosecute the crime was considered by a Special Working Group on the Crime of
Aggression of the Assembly of States Parties, of which membership was open to
all Member States of the United Nations.52 The Permanent Representative of the
Principality of Liechtenstein in the United Nations, Ambassador Chistian
Wenaweser, initially chaired the Special Working Group.53 He was subsequently
succeeded by His Royal Highness Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al‐Hussein of Jordan,54
who deserves special mention for his extremely competent leadership role as
facilitator of the Special Working Group in the final year before, and during, the
Review Conference.
Informal inter‐sessional meetings on the crime of aggression, commonly
referred to as the Princeton Process, were held annually in the period 2004–
2007 at Princeton University.55
Those meetings were hosted by the
Liechtenstein Institute on Self‐Determination and the Woodrow Wilson School of
Princeton University.56 The Princeton Process received generous financial
support from the governments of Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany,
Liechtenstein, Mexico, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland.57 It conducted
its business with a focus on three distinct “baskets”: defining acts of aggression
(coordinated by Phani Dascalopoulou‐Livada of Greece); defining the crime of
aggression (coordinated by Claus Kreβ of Germany); and establishing the
conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction (coordinated by Pal Wrange of
Sweden).58
Progress made during this phase of the proceedings is reflected in the
2007 Chairman’s Discussion Paper of Christian Wenaweser,59 of which a revised
PCNICC/2002/WGCA/DP.2 (June 21, 2002). See Discussion Paper Proposed by the
Coordinator, supra note 37, ¶ II, for the final draft of the elements of the crime of
aggression.
52
ICC, Contuinity of Work in Respect of the Crime of Aggression, Assembly of States
Parties Res. ICC‐ASP/1/Res.1, ICC Doc. ICC‐ASP/1/3 (Sept. 9, 2002).
53
Weisbord, supra note 1, at 176.
54
Claus Kreß, The Kampala Compromise on the Crime of Aggression, 8 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST.
1179, 1217 n.83 (2010).
55
See PRINCETON PROCESS ON THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION: MATERIALS OF THE SPECIAL WORKING
GROUP ON THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION, 2003–2009, at viii (Stefan Barriga, Wolfgang
Danspeckgruber & Christian Wenaweser eds., 2009).
56
Id.
57
Id. at x.
58
Id.
59
ICC, Discussion Paper Proposed by the Chairman, Assembly of States Parties, Resumed
5th Sess., Jan. 29–Feb. 1, 2007, ICC Doc. ICC‐ASP/5/SWGCA/2, Annex (Jan. 16, 2007). See
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version was published in 2008.60 The revised version of the Chairman’s
Discussion Paper contained a proposed definition of the crime of aggression
(Article 8bis) which is the one that eventually came to be accepted by general
agreement at the Review Conference in Kampala.61 As to the conditions for the
exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression (Article 15bis), the Working
Group remained divided, particularly as far as the role of the Security Council
was concerned. Different options for alternative jurisdictional filters (a Pre‐Trial
Chamber of the ICC, the General Assembly of the United Nations, or the ICJ),
remained in contention. It is perhaps worth noting that Belgium submitted a
proposal in January 2007, confining a jurisdictional filter for investigations into
the crime of aggression, following a State Party referral or investigations proprio
motu, to an extended (six‐judges) Pre‐Trial Chamber of the ICC.62 That, after all,
formed the basis of what came to be accepted in Kampala by general agreement.
The December 2007 Report of the Special Working Group on the Crime of
Aggression recorded that several delegations preferred to link the crime of
aggression to an “armed attack” rather than to an “act of aggression” but that
those delegations were willing to accept the deletion of the “armed attack”
option.63
A final informal meeting of the Assembly of States Parties was held from
June 8–10, 2009 at the Princeton Club in New York City.64 A substantial part of
the proceedings dealt with the Elements of Crimes for the crime of aggression.65
These initiatives paved the way for reaching the final goal of the
Assembly of States Parties and its Special Working Group on the Crime of
Aggression at the Review Conference in Kampala.
Weisbord, supra note 1, at 176–208, for an overview of the discussion paper.
60
ICC, Discussion Paper on the Crime of Aggression Proposed by the Chairman (Revision
June 2008), Assembly of States Parties, Resumed 6th Sess., June 2–6, 2008, ICC Doc. ICC‐
ASP/6/SWGCA/2, Annex (May 14, 2008).
61
Id. art. 8bis.
62
ICC, Rep. of the Special Working Grp. on the Crime of Aggression, Assembly of States
Parties, Resumed 5th Sess., Jan. 29–Feb. 1, 2007, ¶ 29, ICC Doc. ICC‐ASP/5/35, Annex II
(Feb. 2007) [hereinafter 5th Sess. Rep. of the Special Working Grp.].
63
ICC, Rep. of the Special Working Grp. on the Crime of Aggression, Assembly of States
Parties, 6th Sess., Nov. 30–Dec. 12, 2007, ¶ 13, ICC Doc. ICC‐ASP/6/SWGCA/1 (Dec. 13,
2007) [hereinafter 6th Sess. Rep. of the Special Working Grp.].
64
ICC, Rep. on the Informal Inter‐Sessional Meeting on the Crime of Aggression, Hosted
by the Liechtenstein Institute on Self‐Determination, Woodrow Wilson School, at the
Princeton Club, New York, 8 to 10 June 2009, Assembly of States Parties, 8th Sess., Nov.
18–26, 2009, ICC Doc. ICC‐ASP/8/INF.2 (July 10, 2009) [hereinafter 8th Sess. Rep. on the
Informal Inter‐Sessional Meeting].
65
Id.
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III. DEFINING THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION
On February 13, 2009, at the Resumed Seventh Session of the Assembly
of States Parties (February 9–13, 2009) and after lengthy and intense
deliberations during the preceding years, the Special Working Group on the
Crime of Aggression, chaired at the time by Ambassador Christian Wenaweser of
Liechtenstein, proposed a definition of the crime of aggression which enjoyed
wide support and was eventually inserted into the ICC Statute as Article 8bis.66
Professor Roger Clark recorded that the definition was adopted by “a substantial
consensus,” noting that “not everyone in the Working Group was entirely happy
with everything” contained in the definition.67 At its Eighth Session (November
18–26, 2009), the Assembly of States Parties decided to forward to the Review
Conference for its consideration amendments of the ICC Statute,68 which
included the definition of the crime of aggression proposed by the Working
Group in February 2009.69
Although there was overwhelming support for inserting the proposed
Article 8bis in the ICC Statute, several delegations (for example Iran and
Malaysia) still questioned aspects of the definition, notably a passage in the
definition requiring that the crime of aggression must amount to “a manifest
violation of the Charter of the United Nations” (emphasis added).70 At the final
session of the Assembly of States Parties that preceded the Review Conference,
and in the first week of the Review Conference, the delegation of the United
States questioned aspects of the definition and appealed to the Conference not
to proceed with any final decisions on the crime of aggression. Professor Harold
Koh, speaking on behalf of the United States, maintained that “as yet, no
authoritative definition of aggression exists under customary international law,”
and that the crimes listed in Resolution 3314, “if committed in isolation, would
not necessarily qualify as a crime of aggression.”71 He proposed the addition of
66

ICC, Rep. of the Special Working Grp. on the Crime of Aggression, Assembly of States
Parties, Resumed 6th Sess., June 2–6, 2008, ¶ 2, art. 8bis, ICC Doc. ICC‐ASP/6/20/Add.1,
app. I, Annex (2008) [hereinafter Working Group Report].
67
Roger S. Clark, Negotiating Provisions Defining the Crime of Aggression, Its Elements
and the Conditions for ICC Exercise of Jurisdiction over It, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1103, 1104
(2009).
68
ICC, Review Conference, Assembly of States Parties Res. ICC‐ASP/8/Res.6, ¶ 3, ICC Doc.
ICC‐ASP/8/Res.6 (Nov. 26, 2009).
69
Id. Annex II, app., art. 8bis.
70
See supra text accompanying notes 38, 42.
71
Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Statement at the Review Conf.
at
the
Int’l
Criminal
Court
(June
4,
2010),
http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/142665.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2011)
[hereinafter Koh Statement]; see also Theodor Meron, Defining Aggression for the
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“understandings” to the definition of aggression “to make clear that those who
undertake efforts to prevent war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide—
the very crimes that the Rome Statute is designed to deter—do not commit
‘manifest’ violations of the U.N. Charter . . . and should not run the risk of
prosecution.”72
On the final day of the Review Conference it was decided by general
agreement to insert Article 8bis, into the ICC Statute, which defines as follows
the crime of aggression and an act of aggression:
(1) For the purpose of the Statute, “crime of aggression” means the
planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position
effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military
action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity
and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United
Nations.
(2) For the purpose of paragraph (1), “act of aggression” means the use
of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or
independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Charter of the United Nations. Any of the following acts,
regardless of a declaration of war, shall, in accordance with United
Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974,
qualify as an act of aggression:
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the
territory of another State, or any military occupation, however
temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any
annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State
or part thereof;
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the
territory of another State or the use of any weapon by a State
against the territory of another State;

International Criminal Court, 25 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 1, 9 (2001) (expressing doubt
as to whether G.A. Res. 3314 reflects customary international law for the crime of
aggression). Contra Claus Kreβ, Time for Decision: Some Thoughts on the Immediate
Future of the Crime of Aggression: A Reply to Andreas Paulus, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1129,
1139 (2010) (referring to “the crime of aggression under customary international law, as
it has evolved from the ‘creative precedents’ of Nuremberg and Tokyo”).
72
Koh Statement, supra note 71; Roger S. Clark, Amendments to the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court Considered at the First Review Conference on the Court,
Kampala, 31 May–11 June 2010, 2 GOETTINGEN J. INT’L L. 689, 698–99 (2010).
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(c) The blockade of the ports or coast of a State by the armed
forces of another State;
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or
air forces, or marine and air fleets of another State;
(e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the
territory of another State with the agreement of the receiving
State, in contravention of the conditions provided for in the
agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory
beyond the termination of the agreement;
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has
placed at the disposal of another State, to be used by that other
State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State;
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands,
groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed
force against another State of such gravity as to amount to the
73
acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein.

The definition of “crime of aggression” has several special features worth
emphasizing:
(a) It denotes the offence as a leadership crime: only “a person in a position
effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military
action of a State” can be prosecuted for the crime of aggression.74
(b) The definition of “act of aggression” simply repeats General Assembly
Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974.75
(c) The Drafters were particularly sensitive to a resolve to confine the
subject‐matter jurisdiction of the ICC to conduct that constitutes offences
under customary international law, and to that end inserted a phrase
requiring that the act of aggression, from which prosecution for the crime
of aggression may stem, must “by its character, gravity and scale,
constitute[] a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations.”76
(d) Drafters excluded from the definition the means of perpetration, such as
“participation in a common plan or conspiracy,” which constituted part of
73

ICC, The Crime of Aggression, Review Conf. Res. RC/Res.6, ¶ 2, ICC Doc. ICC‐
ASP‐RC/11, Annex I (June 11, 2010).
74
Id. ¶ 1.
75
Id. ¶ 2.
76
Id. ¶ 1.
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the definition of crimes against peace in the Nuremberg Charter, or
“participates actively” in the conduct that constitutes a crime of
aggression, which was included in earlier drafts of the crime of aggression
for ICC purposes.77

The definition of the crime of aggression was further elaborated by a
number of introductory paragraphs and Elements of Crimes.78 The introductory
observations explain that every one of the acts listed in Article 8bis(2), taken on
their own, qualifies as an act of aggression; that it is not necessary for a
conviction of the crime of aggression to show that the perpetrator made a legal
evaluation as to whether the use of armed force was inconsistent with the U.N.
Charter, or as to whether the violation of the U.N. Charter was “manifest”; and
that “manifest” is an objective qualification of the wrongful act.79
The Elements of Crimes are for the most part self‐evident: An act of
aggression was committed; the perpetrator planned, prepared, initiated or
executed the act of aggression; the perpetrator was in a position effectively to
exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of the State
which committed the act of aggression; the perpetrator was aware of the factual
circumstances that rendered the use of armed force inconsistent with the U.N.
Charter, and also of the factual circumstances that rendered the act a manifest
violation of the U.N. Charter; and it is the character, gravity and scale of the act
of aggression that renders it a manifest violation of the U.N. Charter.
The distinct components of the crime of aggression as defined by the
Review Conference will next be analyzed in slightly more detail.
A. Aggression as a Leadership Crime
Defining aggression as a leadership crime renders this crime, in
comparison with other crimes within the subject‐matter jurisdiction of the ICC,
quite unique; that is, in at least two respects:
(a) It adds a political dimension to the crime of aggression which is not
necessarily part of genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes; and
(b) It limits the basis of liability (almost) entirely to principal or co‐principal
perpetrators.

77

Nuremberg Charter, supra note 6; 5th Sess. Rep. on the Informal Inter‐Sessional
Meeting, supra note 42, Annex II, ¶ 1.
78
Review Conf. Res. RC/Res.6, supra note 73, Annex II.
79
Id.
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The political dimension derives from the link between the crime of
aggression and an act of aggression, which is essentially an act of state. It raises
the question whether state consent is required for the exercise of jurisdiction by
the ICC over the crime of aggression.
Prosecutions in international tribunals of natural persons (individuals) for
customary‐law crimes are indeed not dependent on consent of the accused or of
the State of his or her nationality.80 However, the competence of the ICC to
decide that an act of aggression has taken place could arguably fall under the
norm of general international law, which makes the jurisdiction of international
tribunals over States subject to consent of the States concerned.81 The judgment
of the International Court of Justice in the Monetary Gold Removal Case of 1954
may be cited in support of the proposition that an international tribunal cannot
decide a dispute between State A and State B that implicates the interests of
State C without the consent of State C.82 The rule was quite clearly summarized
by the ICJ in that case:
Where, as in the present case, the vital issue to be settled concerns the
international responsibility of a third State, the Court cannot, without
the consent of that third State, give a decision on that issue binding
83
upon any State, either the third State, or any of the parties before it.

Although the ICJ was not here dealing with criminal prosecution, the
Review Conference nevertheless decided to play it safe by affording to States
Parties, in the case of State Party referrals and investigations proprio motu, the
right not to accept the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC over crimes of
80

See Antonio Cassese, When May Senior State Officials Be Tried for International
Crimes? Some Comments on the Congo v. Belgium Case, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 853, 861–62
n.23 (2002) (referring to a paper submitted by Germany, which stated that, under
current international law, jurisdiction was not dependent on the nationality or consent
of the accused).
81
Cf. Gerald Hafner, Kristen Boon, Anne Rubesame & Jonathan Huston, A Response to
the American View as Presented by Ruth Wedgwood, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 108, 116 (1999)
(“Detractors claim that [the] potential jurisdiction over the nationals of non‐state parties
is a contravention of international law . . . .”).
82
Monetary Gold Removal from Rome in 1943 (It. v. Fr., U.K. & U.S.), 1954 I.C.J. 19, ¶¶
32–33 (June 15) [hereinafter Monetary Gold]; see also Covey T. Oliver, The Monetary
Gold Decision in Perspective, 49 AM. J. INT’L L. 216, 221 (1955) (“[The] dispute could not
be decided without the appearance of [the third party] Albania.”); D.H.N. Johnson, The
Case of the Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943, 4 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 93, 94
(1955) (discussing a submission that argued that the Court had no jurisdiction because
the first submission in the Italian Application included an issue of the international
responsibility of Albania to Italy, and Albania had not provided consent to such
jurisdiction).
83
Monetary Gold, supra note 82, at 33.
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aggression committed by their nationals or on their territory.84 The “opt‐out”
option will be dealt with hereafter in greater detail.85
The Review Conference saw fit to add a subsection to Article 25(3), which
outlines the means of perpetration for which one can be convicted in the ICC, to
record that aggression is a leadership crime.86 This added section reiterates
what is already stated in the definition of aggression, namely:
In respect of the crime of aggression, the provisions of this article shall apply
only to persons in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct
the political or military action of a State.87

It stands to reason that such persons in authority can be prosecuted as
principal perpetrators or co‐perpetrators, or for ordering, soliciting or inducing
persons under their political or military control to commit the crime of
aggression.88 Liability for the crime of aggression of a person in a leadership
position who merely “aids”, “abets”, or “otherwise assists” in the commission or
attempted commission of the crime,89 or who “contributes” in any other way to
the commission or attempted commission of the crime by a group of persons
acting with a common purpose,90 would seemingly be out of the question. As
note by Roger Clark, the crime of aggression “has its own set of … nouns”, such
as planning, preparation, initiation or execution of an act of aggression, that do
not cover all the means of perpetration listed in Article 25(3).91 It is also highly
unlikely that prosecutions for attempted aggression would be feasible.92 Roger
Clark noted that Resolution 3314 does not contemplate an attempt to commit
aggression but that attempted aggression might be construed “where troops are
massed at the border but bombed into oblivion before they can move,” or where
the perpetrator “tries to contribute to the ‘planning, preparation, initiation or
waging’ of an aggression that takes place, but he or she fails in the effort to
contribute.”93 The Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression noted,
84

Review Conf. Res. RC/Res.6, supra note 73, ¶ 3, art. 15bis(4).
See infra Part C.4.
86
Review Conf. Res. RC/Res.6, supra note 73, ¶ 5.
87
Id.
88
ICC Statute, supra note 4, art. 25(3)(a)–(b).
89
Id. art. 25(3)(c).
90
Id. art. 25(3)(d).
91
Clark, supra note 37, at 883–84.
92
ICC Statute, supra note 4, art. 25(3)(f).
93
Clark, supra note 37, at 884; see also ICC, Rep. of the Informal Inter‐Sessional Meeting
of the Special Working Grp. on the Crime of Aggression, held at the Liechtenstein
Institute on Self‐Determination, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, New
Jersey, United States, from 13 to 15 June 2005, Assembly of States Parties, 4th Sess.,
Nov. 28–Dec. 3, 2005, ¶¶ B(II)(1)(b), B(II)2, ICC Doc. ICC‐ASP/4/32, Annex II.B (June
85
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with acclamation, that “such cases of attempt remain rather theoretical in
nature.”94
The question whether the person in a position of authority could also be
held vicariously liable, in the case of military commanders or persons acting
effectively as military commanders, for crimes of aggression committed by
persons under their effective command and control, or, in the case of non‐
military superiors, for crimes of aggression committed by persons under their
effective authority and control,95 was debated at earlier stages of the
deliberation.96 The matter was raised in the 2008 Chairman’s Paper presented to
the Special Working Group, but was dismissed by delegations who maintained
that Article 28 of the ICC Statute (dealing with vicarious liability of military
commanders and other persons in a position of authority) will never be relevant
to the crime of aggression.97
In its earlier deliberations, the Special Working Group on the Crime of
Aggression also paid attention to the (non‐) applicability of Article 33 of the ICC
Statute, which stipulates the circumstances under which superior order will and
will not be an excuse.98 The view that prevailed was the one which noted that, as
a leadership crime, the crime of aggression is “not applicable to mid‐, or lower‐
level individuals.”99 Since the subordinate acting upon superior orders is not the
one that will be prosecuted for the crime of aggression, Article 33 simply does
not apply and nothing further need to be said or done in this regard.
Confining the perpetrator of a crime of aggression to persons who
“effectively . . . exercise control over or . . . direct” the political or military action
of a State has been criticized as being too restrictive. One analyst proposed that
the reach of aggression should be extended to also include conduct of secondary
perpetrators, such as “private economic actors” (industrialists who facilitate acts
of aggression) and third‐State officials (political or military officials of State B
who are complicit in acts of aggression committed by State A), and to that end
proposed that “exercise control over or . . . direct” be replaced in the definition
2005) [hereinafter 4th Sess. Rep. of the Informal Inter‐Sessional Meeting] (discussing
“the case of an attempted individual act of participation in a completed collective act”
and “the case of the ‘commenced but uncompleted’ collective act”).
94
4th Sess. Rep. of the Informal Inter‐Sessional Meeting, supra note 93, ¶ B(II)(1)(b).
95
See ICC Statute, supra note 4, art. 28 (setting forth the responsibility of commanders
and other superiors).
96
Working Group Report, supra note 66, Annex II, ¶¶ 19–22.
97
Id. ¶ 20.
98
See, e.g., 4th Sess. Rep. of the Informal Inter‐Sessional Meeting, supra note 93, Annex
II.A, ¶¶ 44–46 (discussing the “retention, exclusion or adaptation of article 33 of the
Rome Statute”).
99
Id. ¶ 45.
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of the crime of aggression with “shape or influence.”100 With certain Nuremberg
cases in mind, the “shape or influence” option was raised in the June 2007
session of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, but was not
acceptable to some delegation, because “the responsibility of persons beyond
the direct leaders would be difficult to prove.”101
B. Acts of Aggression
Acts of aggression are confined for ICC purposes to those specified in
General Assembly Resolution 3314.102 Resolution 3314 in addition affords to the
Security Council the competence to determine that acts other than those listed
by name also “constitute aggression under the provisions of the [U.N.]
Charter.”103 Drafters of Article 8bis saw fit not to add such an open‐ended
provision to the particular instances of acts of aggression listed in Resolution
3314 but to confine acts of aggression to those enumerated in Resolution
3314.104
Concerns that have been articulated by some analysts regarding the
substance of Resolution 3314 are not entirely without foundation.105 As noted
by Ben Ferencz shortly after its adoption in 1974, Resolution 3314 contained
“negotiated compromises and deftly obscured clauses which were deemed
necessary in the process of reaching consensus,”106 and the list of acts that

100

Kevin J. Heller, Retreat from Nuremberg: The Leadership Requirement in the Crime of
Aggression, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 477, 496–97 (2007).
101
ICC, Rep. on the Informal Inter‐Sessional Meeting of the Special Working Grp. on the
Crime of Aggression, Held at the Liechtenstein Institute on Self‐Determination,
Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, United States, from 11 to 14 June 2007,
transmitted by note of the Secretariat, Assembly of States Parties, 6th Sess., Nov. 30–
Dec. 14, 2007, ¶ 12, ICC Doc. ICC‐ASP/6/SWGCA/INF.1 (July 25, 2007) [hereinafter 6th
Sess. Rep. on the Informal Inter‐Sessional Meeting]; see also Elements of the Crime of
Aggression Proposed by Samoa, Working Grp. On the Crime of Aggression, 10th Sess.,
July 1–12, 2002, pt. 5, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2002/WGCA/DP.2 (2002) (referring to the
perpetrator as someone “who need not formally be a member of the Government or
the military,” and being in “an . . . [effective] position to exercise control over or direct
the military action of the State,” in order to encapsulate the Nuremberg “industrialist
cases”).
102
Review Conf. Res. RC/Res.6, supra note 73, ¶ 2.
103
G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 5, art. 4.
104
See Clark, supra note 67, at 1105 (“The drafting of Article 8bis is aimed at avoiding
the open‐ended nature of Resolution 3314.”).
105
See Kreβ, supra note 71, at 1136 (“The idea of using Resolution 3314 was by no
means uncontroversial.”).
106
Benjamin B. Ferencz, The United Nations Consensus Definition of Aggression: Sieve or
Substance, 10 J. INT’L L. & ECON. 701, 709 (1975).
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would qualify as aggression admittedly also contains ambiguities.107 However,
generality and ambiguity are not uncommon in legal instruments, and judges are
well trained to apply sweeping provisions to specific fact scenarios, to create
consistency within the array of conflicting provisions, and to afford a workable
degree of legal certainty and practicality to dubious language often employed by
law makers. And should the Security Council find cause to identify new instances
of aggression beyond those listed in Resolution 3314, nothing would prevent the
Assembly of States Parties to consider adding those to the enumerated acts of
aggression by means of an amendment of the ICC Statute.108
A number of delegations, including the one of Germany, nevertheless
preferred a “generic approach” that would denote the act of aggression merely
as an “armed attack” in contravention of the U.N. Charter without reference to
Resolution 3314.109 Proponents of the generic approach noted that Resolution
3314 “was a political instrument negotiated in a different context and not
related to issues of individual criminal responsibility.”110 At the June 2005
Informal Inter‐Sessional Meeting of the Special Working Group on the Crime of
Aggression it was noted that there was “a considerable preference” for the
generic approach.111
There is one passage in the Elements of Crimes that seemingly qualifies,
and in fact narrows down, the acts of aggression listed in Resolution 3314.
Those acts of aggression will only constitute the basis of the crime of aggression
if they amount to “the use of armed force . . . against the sovereignty, territorial
integrity or political independence of another State.”112 This provision exceeds
the provision in the U.N. Charter that calls on Member States to “refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
107

Id. at 711–13; see also Michael J. Glennon, The Fog of Law: Self‐Defense, Inherence,
and Incoherence in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
539, 556 (2002) (“[N]o consensus exists within the international community as to what
constitutes ‘aggression.’”); Daniel D. Ntando Nsereko, Aggression under the Rome
Statute of the International Court, 71 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 497, 501–04 (2002) (explaining
that the definition of aggression is flawed and imprecise in several respects).
108
See ICC Statute, supra note 4, art. 121 (noting that any state may propose an
amendment to the statute without setting forth any definitional restrictions).
109
6th Sess. Rep. on the Informal Inter‐Sessional Meeting, supra note 101, ¶ 37.
110
5th Sess. Rep. of the Special Working Grp., supra note 62, ¶ 22.
111
ICC, Rep. on the Informal Inter‐Sessional Meeting of the Special Working Grp. on the
Crime of Aggression, held by the Liechtenstein Institute on Self‐Determination,
Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, New Jersey, United States, from 13 to 15
June 2005, Assembly of States Parties, Resumed 4th Sess., Nov. 28–Dec. 5, 2005, ¶ 75,
ICC Doc. ICC‐ASP/4/32, Annex II.A (2005).
112
8th Sess. Rep. on the Informal Inter‐Sessional Meeting, supra note 64, Annex I,
element 3.
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integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”113 Including in the
Elements of Crimes “the use of armed force . . . against the sovereignty . . . of
another State”114 adds a dimension to the crime of aggression that is not part of
the U.N. Charter proscription. The U.N. Charter refers only to “the territorial
integrity” and “political independence” of the State under attack.115 This is an
important distinction since it may implicate the future legality of humanitarian
interventions.
Humanitarian intervention will admittedly only be warranted in
exceptional circumstances.116 It is per definition not aimed at the changing of
territorial borders of the State under attack, nor does it challenge the political
independence of that State.117 Its sole purpose is to bring to an end extreme,
and at the time ongoing, violations of human rights perpetrated by a repressive
political regime.118 Humanitarian intervention may perhaps be seen as an
affront against the sovereignty of the State under attack, but does not amount
to the use of force “against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any state” within the meaning of the U.N. Charter.119 According to Julius Stone, a
blanket prohibition of the threat or use of force, furthermore, cannot be
reconciled with the provisions of Article 2(3) of the U.N. Charter, which calls
upon Member States to settle international disputes by peaceful means and in
such a manner that international peace “and justice” are not endangered.120
Michael Reisman argued in similar vein that the prohibition in the U.N. Charter
of the threat or use of force must be read in conjunction with the overarching
human rights concerns of the United Nations as recorded in several provisions of
the U.N. Charter,121 of which humanitarian intervention is, according to him, a
logical extension.122
113

U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
8th Sess. Rep. on the Informal Inter‐Sessional Meeting, supra note 64, Annex I,
element 3.
115
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
116
See Michael Reisman, Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos, in HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 167, 177 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1973) (noting that
humanitarian intervention is justified when it is precipitated by extreme human rights
deprivations and conforms to general international legal regulations governing the use
of force).
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
JULIUS STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER: A CRITIQUE OF UNITED NATIONS THEORIES OF
AGGRESSION 95 (Joseph Perkovich ed., The Lawbook Exchange Ltd. 2006) (1958).
120
Id. at 95; see also id. at 98–101 (discussing the “absurdities of the extreme
interpretation”).
121
Reisman, supra note 116, at 177–78.
122
Id.; see also Adam Roberts, The So‐Called “Right” of Humanitarian Intervention, 3 Y.B.
114
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Besides the general prohibition of the use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any State, certain particular instances of
armed action are expressly authorized by the U.N. Charter, namely, (i) collective
armed intervention under auspices of the Security Council as a means of putting
an end to a situation that constitutes a threat to the peace, a breach of the
peace or an act of aggression;123 and (ii) individual or collective self‐defense in
cases where an armed attack occurred against a Member State of the United
Nations.124
This raises the question whether the U.N. Charter deals
comprehensively with all instances of (un)lawful armed interventions. There are
strong arguments to be made in support of the proposition that it does not.
(a) In the 1950 Uniting for Peace Resolution, the United Nations itself went
beyond its own Charter provisions by authorizing the sanctioning of
armed interventions by the General Assembly as a means of
counteracting a breach of the peace or an act of aggression in instances
where the Security Council, “because of lack of unanimity of the
Permanent Members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security.”125
(b) The General Assembly has also on several occasions acknowledged the
legitimacy of wars of liberation against colonial rule, foreign domination
or racist regimes,126 and on occasion stated explicitly that a “legitimate
INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 3, 8 (2000) (discussing three bases of support for the view that the
U.N. Charter leaves some scope for humanitarian intervention).
123
U.N. Charter art. 42.
124
See Id. art. 51 (requiring that in cases of collective self‐defense, the State for whose
benefit this right is used must declare itself to be the victim of an armed attack); Military
and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 196,
199 (June 27) (stating that the victim State must furthermore request the assistance of
the other State or States participating in the collective defense of the victim State).
125
G.A. Res. 377 (V), ¶ 1, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, U.N. Doc. A/1775, at 10
(Nov. 3, 1950).
126
See G.A. Res. 3163 (XXVIII), ¶ 5, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, U.N. Doc.
A/9030, at 5 (Dec. 14, 1973) (proclaiming the legitimacy of the struggle of the people
under colonial and alien domination to exercise their right to self‐determination and
independence by all necessary means); G.A. Res. 3411 (XXX), U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess.,
Supp. No. 34, U.N. Doc. A/10034, at 36 (Dec. 10, 1975) (proclaiming the legitimacy of
the struggle against a racist regime by all means possible); G.A. Res. 35/206, ¶ 1, U.N.
GAOR 35th Sess., Supp. No. 48, U.N. Doc. A/35/48, at 29 (Dec. 16, 1980) (reaffirming
“the legitimacy of the struggle of the people of South Africa”); G.A. Res. 36/172, ¶ 13,
U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/36/51, at 38 (Dec. 17, 1981)
(condemning the actions of states that have “increased their . . . relations with the racist
regime of South Africa despite repeated appeals by the General Assembly”); see also
S.C. Res. 437, ¶ 4, U.N. SCOR 35th Year, U.N. Doc. S/INF/36, at 18 (June 13, 1980)
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struggle” includes the armed struggle of liberation movements.127
(c) Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 also afforded
legitimacy to wars of liberation by proclaiming that such wars are
governed by the rules of humanitarian law applying to international
armed conflicts.128

Humanitarian intervention, though not expressly sanctioned by the U.N.
Charter, will therefore most likely not be considered as an act of aggression for
ICC purposes. Humanitarian intervention is exclusively aimed at liberating the
subjects of a repressive government from current and ongoing atrocities that
shocks the conscience of the world. Those engaged in humanitarian
interventions do not intend to undermine the territorial integrity or political
independence of the State under attack. It also seems feasible to conclude, as
did Michael Reisman,129 that the humane concerns which motivate humanitarian
intervention are in conformity with, and not contrary to, the human rights
commitments of the United Nations.130

(proclaiming the legitimacy of the struggle of the South African people for the
elimination of apartheid); Stephen M. Schwebel, Wars of Liberation as Fought in U.N.
Organs, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 446, 447 (John Norton Moore ed.,
1974) (noting that wars of liberation “are treated by the international community as an
exception from Charter prohibitions on the use of force”).
127
G.A. Res. 38/39A ¶ 4, U.N. GAOR 38th Sess., Supp. No. 47, U.N. Doc. A/38/47, at 36
(Dec. 5, 1983); G.A. Res. 37/69A ¶ 16, U.N. GAOR 37th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc.
A/37/51, at 28 (Dec. 9, 1982); see also G.A. Res. 38/39A ¶ 4, U.N. GAOR 38th Sess.,
Supp. No. 47, U.N. Doc. A/38/47, at 36 (Dec. 5, 1983) (recognizing the right of oppressed
people to resort to “all the means at their disposal, including armed struggle, in their
resistance to the illegitimate racist minority regime of South Africa”).
128
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 1, para. 4, June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391; see also Karl Joseph Partsch, Armed Conflict,
in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 249, 251 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1992)
(including wars of liberation in the list of international armed conflicts).
129
See supra the text accompanying notes 116–18.
130
Elise Leclerc‐Gagné and Michael Byers proposed that humanitarian intervention
should be legalized by adjusting the mens rea requirement for convictions in the ICC so
as to recognize the perpetrator’s “principal motivation” to use force based on “a
genuine humanitarian desire to prevent gross human rights violations.” Elise Leclerc‐
Gagné & Michael Byers, A Question of Intent: The Crime of Aggression and Unilateral
Humanitarian Intervention, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 379, 387 (2009). This is a bad idea.
Motive can have an aggravating or mitigating effect on sentencing but is not a
constituent component of mens rea. And as noted in the text, humanitarian
intervention most likely does not amount to an act of aggression within the meaning of
U.N. Charter directives.
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Direct military interventions without United Nations approval to
overthrow corrupt regimes, which is included in the so‐called “Reagan Doctrine”
as explained to the Security Council on January 20, 2000 by the late Senator
Jesse Helms,131 do amount to acts of aggression.
C. The U.N. Charter Constraint
Proclaiming that the crime of aggression must “by its character, gravity
and scale, constitute[] a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations”
may also invite disputed interpretations.
What, for example, is the meaning to be attributed to “a manifest
violation” of the U.N. Charter, which qualifies the act of aggression upon which
prosecutions for the crime of aggression can be based? Some delegations
defined it as “an obvious illegal violation,” while others interpreted the phrase to
mean “a violation with serious consequences”, and yet a third group attributed
to the concept of “manifest” a meaning that would require the violation to be
both obviously illegal and one with serious consequences.132
“A manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations” is
furthermore dependent on the character, gravity and scale of the act of
aggression.133 Two Understandings were added to the definition of the crime of
aggression to clarify the meaning of “a manifest violation of the Charter of the
United Nations,” and which also have a bearing on the meaning to be attributed
to the “character, gravity and scale” of the act of aggression. Understanding 6
provides:
It is understood that aggression is the most serious and dangerous form of
illegal use of force, and that a determination whether an act of aggression
has been committed requires consideration of all circumstances of each
particular case, including the gravity of the acts concerned and their
consequences, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.134

This Understanding suggests that the gravity and consequences of the act
of aggression are more important than its scale. However, Understanding 7
131

Senator Jesse Helms, Address to the United Nations Security Council (Jan. 20, 2000),
reprinted in In the Words of Helms: ‘A Lack of Gratitude’, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2000, at
A8; JOHAN D. VAN DER VYVER, IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE UNITED STATES,
240–41 (2010).
132
JUSTIN HACCIUS, CHATHAM HOUSE, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: REVIEWING THE
REVIEW CONFERENCE 6 (2010).
133
8th Sess. Rep. on the Informal Inter‐Sessional Meeting, supra note 64, Annex I,
element 5.
134
Review Conf. Res. RC/Res.6, supra note 73, Annex II, ¶ 6.
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places the three attributes of acts of aggression on an equal footing. It provides:
It is understood that in establishing whether an act of aggression constitutes
a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations, the three
components of character, gravity and scale must be sufficient to justify a
“manifest” determination. No one component can be significant enough to
satisfy the manifest standard by itself.135

These understandings reflect the view that prosecutions in the ICC of the
crime of aggression will not be justified in all instances of the unlawful use of
force but will be confined to the most serious and dangerous armed
interventions.136
D. A Differentiated Approach
The ICC Statute regulates in different sections the definitions of crimes
(Articles 6, 7 and 8), and the various means of participation in the concerned
criminal conduct that would attract criminal responsibility (Article 25(3)). It thus
deviated from the Nuremberg Charter, which referred in the definition of crimes
against peace to participation in a “common plan or conspiracy,”137 and from the
definition of the crime of aggression proposed by the Preparatory Commission,
which included the phrase “orders or participates actively” in the conduct
constituting an act of aggression.138 The Preparatory Commission’s definition
also incorporated the mens rea requirement of “intentionally and knowingly”
committing any of the acts of aggression.139 The mental element of crimes
within the jurisdiction of the ICC is also separated from the definitions of crimes
and dealt with in a distinct section of the ICC Statute (Article 30).
At the inter‐sessional meeting of the Special Working Group on the Crime
of Aggression held at Princeton University in June 2006, a distinction was made
between the “monistic approach” reflected in the definitions of the crime of
aggression in the Nuremberg Charter and as proposed by the Preparatory
Commission, and a “differentiated approach” adhered to by drafters of the ICC
Statute. It was agreed in principle “that the differentiated approach was
preferable in that it treated the crime of aggression in the same way as the other

135

Id. Annex III, ¶ 7.
Clark, supra note 72, at 699.
137
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis art. 6(a), Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
138
Rep. of the Preparatory Comm’n for the Int’l Criminal Court, Discussion Paper
Proposed by the Coordinator, 10th Sess., July 1–12, 2002, add., pt. II(I)(1), U.N. Doc.
PCNICC/2002/2/Add.2 (July 24, 2002).
139
Id.
136
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crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court.”140 The differentiated approach was
reflected in the definition of the crime of aggression contained in a non‐paper of
the Chairman attached to the Report of the Special Working Group on the Crime
of Aggression of December 2007.141
In conformity with the differentiated approach, the Review Conference
omitted references to the means of perpetration of the crime of aggression from
the definition of that crime and, while noting that the means of perpetration of
the crime of aggression is quite unique, decided instead to add a provision to
Article 25(3) to make the point. Article 25(3) reiterates that perpetrators of the
crime of aggression are confined to “persons in a position effectively to exercise
control over or to direct the political or military action of the State.”142 This
constraint does not apply to those who can be held liable for any of the other
crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC.143
Differentiating between the definition of a crime (Articles 5–8 of the ICC
Statute) and the modes of participation in the commission of the crime (Article
25(3) of the ICC Statute) has been criticized by some analysts in the context of
incitement to commit genocide. By virtue of the fact that incitement to commit
genocide is treated in the ICC Statute as a mode of participation, those analysts
raised the question whether incitement to commit genocide constitutes a crime
in its own right.144 The fact is, though, that distinguishing between a crime and
the means of committing the crime is to be commended and should not in any
way detract from prosecutions for any of those modes of commission of a
crime.145 This also applies to the prosecutions based on different means of
committing the crime of aggression, except of course to the extent that some of
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5th Sess. Rep. on the Informal Inter‐Sessional Meeting, supra note 42, ¶ 84; see also
6th Sess. Rep. on the Informal Inter‐Sessional Meeting, supra note 101, ¶¶ 6–8 (noting
the “broad support for the proposal as a basis for a solution”); Clark, supra note 72, at
1108 (discussing the resolution of the issues through the adoption of the
“differentiated” approach to drafting).
141
6th Sess. Rep. of the Special Working Grp., supra note 63.
142
Review Conf. Res. RC/Res.6, supra note 73, ¶ 5.
143
Id. ¶ 4, art. 15ter(5).
144
See Thomas E. Davies, Note, How the Rome Statute Weakens the International
Prohibition on Incitement to Commit Genocide, 22 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 245, 266–69 (2009)
(discussing the flaws of the Rome Statute’s treatment of incitement and making an
argument for “going back to the Genocide Convention’s treatment of incitement as a
separate crime”).
145
See Gerhard Werle, Individual Criminal Responsibility in Article 25 ICC Statute, 5 J.
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 953, 957, 974 (2007) (discussing how modes of criminal participation
should be “understood as indicative of the degree of individual guilt, and thus as helpful
guidelines in sentencing matters”).
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those means of participation in criminal conduct might not be applicable to the
crime of aggression.
IV. CONDITIONS FOR THE EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION
OVER THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION
The problems that predominated at the Rome Conference with regard to
the conditions under which the ICC would be competent to exercise jurisdiction
over the crime of aggression were mainly centered upon the role of the Security
Council as an exclusive filter of all such prosecutions.146 During the debates that
preceded the Review Conference, the matter was made much more complex by
the introduction of several additional side issues, such as the number of
ratifications required for the entry into force of the amended text of the ICC
Statute, the effect of non‐acceptance by a State Party of the amended text, and
liability of the nationals of non‐party States for the crime of aggression.147 Some
of these issues depended on the meaning to be attached to certain existing
passages in the ICC Statute and should perhaps have been left to interpretation
by the ICC of those passages.
A. Filter Mechanisms
Prosecution in the ICC of perpetrators of the crime of aggression is
dependent on the commission of an act of aggression.148 Who is to decide that
an act of aggression has taken place as a condition precedent to an investigation
by the Prosecutor into the situation in order to identify the perpetrator(s) of a
crime of aggression emanating from the act of aggression; and what binding
effect will the decision as to an act of aggression have on the Prosecutor’s own
assessment, or indeed that of the ICC, of the situation?
The debate centered almost entirely on the role of the Security Council in
this regard. A relatively small number of delegations, including those of the
Super Powers (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States)
and of Australia and Canada insisted that the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC
over the crime of aggression must in all instances be made conditional upon a
prior decision of the Security Council that an act of aggression has been
146

See ICC, Rep. on the Informal Inter‐Sessional Meeting of the Special Working Grp. on
the Crime of Aggression, transmitted by Note by the Secretariat, Assembly of States
Parties, 5th Sess., Nov. 23–Dec. 1, 2006, ¶ 9, ICC Doc. ICC‐ASP/5/SWGCA/1 (Nov. 29,
2006) [hereinafter ASP 5th Sess. Rep. on the Informal Inter‐Sessional Meeting] (noting
that opinions differed on whether jurisdiction over a crime of aggression should be
determined by the Security Council or another body).
147
See infra Part C.3.
148
Review Conf. Res. RC/Res.6, supra note 73, ¶ 3, art. 15bis(6).
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committed.149 Australia more precisely proposed that the Security Council be
granted “the first bite at the cherry,” but not necessarily the last.150 Delegations
insisting upon a Security Council filter for all prosecutions of the crime of
aggression relied almost exclusively on Article 39 of the U.N. Charter which
provides in part: “The Security Council shall determine the existence of any . . .
act of aggression.”151
It should be noted, though, that the Security Council was granted an
exclusive role to determine the existence of an act of aggression under Article 39
for a particular purpose only, namely to decide what punitive action is to be
taken against the State responsible for the act of aggression as a means of
restoring international peace and security.152 Prosecution of the crime of
aggression in the ICC is a totally different cup of tea. The ICC is not responsible
for maintaining or restoring international peace and security and cannot take
action against the aggressor State.153 Nor, in this writer’s respectful opinion, is
the reasoning of Theodor Meron that “a Security Council determination of
aggression would create the necessary legitimacy and therefore increase the
probability of prosecuting the crime of aggression,” 154 convincing.
Delegations that opposed a Security Council filter noted, on the contrary,
that decisions of the Security Council are inspired by political rather than juridical
considerations and that affording to a political body a decisive role in
prosecutions would undermine the independence of the Court.155 As noted by
Judge Schwebel (dissenting) in the Nicaragua Case:
149

ASP 5th Sess. Rep. on the Informal Inter‐Sessional Meeting, supra note 146, Annex II,
¶ 26; Clark, supra note 72, at 699 (noting that the Special Working Group had difficulty
with the issue of whether there is an essential precondition that the Security Council
determine an act of aggression); Donald M. Ferencz, Bringing the Crime of Aggression
Within the Active Jurisdiction of the ICC, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 531, 535–56 (2009)
(examining the issues surrounding the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression
in relation to the Security Council); see also McDougal, supra note 13, at 281–82
(examining the argument for exclusive Security Council authority to determine an act of
aggression).
150
Coalition for the Int’l Criminal Court, Rep. of the Informal Inter‐Sessional Meeting of
the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, Liechtenstein Institute on Self‐
Determination, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, 8–11 June 2006, CICC
Team
on
Aggression,
at
12
(Aug.
26,
2006),
available
at
http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/documents/TeamReportOnIntersessionalMeeting_26
Aug06.pdf.
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U.N. Charter art. 39.
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Id.
153
Meron, supra note 71, at 13–14.
154
Id. at 5.
155
5th Sess. Rep. on the Informal Inter‐Sessional Meeting, supra note 42, ¶ 25; Clark,
supra note 72, at 700 (noting that a Security Council filter “would . . . subvert the power
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[W]hile the Security Council is invested by the Charter [of the United
Nations] with the authority to determine the existence of an act of
aggression, it does not act as a court in making such a determination. It
might arrive at a determination of aggression—or, as more often is the
case, fail to arrive at a determination of aggression—for political rather
than legal reasons.156

It is of course also true that, due to the veto powers of the P5, affording a
role to the Security Council in legal proceedings will in addition undermine the
principle of equal protection of the law,157 and also the principle of nemo debit
esse judex in propria causa (no one should be a judge in his own cause).158 While
negotiations on the crime of aggression were still in their infancy, Antonio
Cassese articulated the expectation that affording to the Prosecutor or to a State
the power to initiate investigations into acts of aggression would be “a welcome
development” since it “might prove a useful counterbalance to the monopolizing
power of the Security Council.”159 Matthias Schuster represented an interesting
variety on the theme of the necessity/undesirability of a role for the Security
Council in prosecutions of the crime of aggression: He agreed with the P5 and
others that a Security Council determination of an act of aggression is a sine qua
non under the current United Nations regime, and also agreed with those who
maintain that affording a role to the Security Council in criminal prosecutions is
of the Court to decide itself on the existence or otherwise of all the elements of the
crime”); Clark, supra note 67, at 1105 (noting that the Security Council, as a political
body, “may act in a completely unprincipled and arbitrary manner”); Ferencz, supra
note 149, at 536 (noting that a role of the Security Council in judicial proceedings would
“undermine the independence of the Court”); see also Nsereko, supra note 107, at 513
(noting that if a role were to be given to the Security Council it would “subordinate law
and justice to power and politics”); Schuster, supra note 10, at 40 (stating that the
political rather than judicial nature of the Security Council “makes the consequences of
its required linkage for the Court even more objectionable”).
156
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14, ¶ 60, 211 (June 27) (Schwebel, J., dissenting).
157
Kreβ, supra note 71, at 1143. At the Review Conference, the delegation of Venezuela
emphasized the importance of securing the independence of the ICC from political
influences, but also spoke out against undermining of the principle of equal justice
through Security Council involvement in criminal proceedings of the ICC. ICC, Remarks of
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Review Conference General Debate (June 1, 2010),
available
at
http://www.icc‐cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/RC2010/Statements/ICC‐RC‐
gendeba‐Venezuela‐ENG.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2011).
158
Mark S. Stein, The Security Council, the International Criminal Court, and the Crime of
Aggression: How Exclusive is the Security Council’s Power to Determine Aggression, 16
IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 10 (2005).
159
Antonio Cassese, The Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some Preliminary
Reflections, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 144, 147–48 (1999).
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highly inappropriate; and for those reasons he believed that aggression should
not be incorporated in the subject‐matter jurisdiction of the ICC.160
Delegations that opposed an exclusive Security Council filter emphasized
Article 24 of the U.N. Charter, which provides that “Members confer on the
Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security.”161 In view of this provision, it was argued that the U.N.
Charter afforded to the Security Council a primary, but not exclusive,
responsibility with regard to aggression.162 Proclaiming that, for purposes other
than executing its Chapter VII punitive powers, the Security Council has been
entrusted with a primary and not an exclusive role in determining that an act of
aggression has taken place derived support from an advisory opinion of the ICJ in
the 1962 case Concerning Expenses of the United Nations,163 and in the 1984
contentious case in which the ICJ assumed jurisdiction to adjudicate a dispute
involving acts of aggression in the case of Nicaragua v. United States of
America.164 The Court (not the Security Council) finally decided (by 12 votes to
3) that by conducting certain military attacks in 1983–1984 and resorting to the
use of force on Nicaraguan territory, the United States “has acted, against the
Republic of Nicaragua, in breach of its obligations under customary international
law not to use force against another State.”165
Delegations within this fold proposed alternative filters, namely the
General Assembly of the United Nations, or the ICJ, or a Pre‐Trial Chamber of the
ICC.166 Toward the end of the Resumed Eighth Session of the Assembly of States
Parties (March 22–25, 2010), a roll call invited by the Facilitator of the Special
Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, H.R.H. Prince Zeid Raad Zeid Al‐
Hussein, revealed overwhelming support for a Pre‐Trial Chamber of the ICC to be
160

Schuster, supra note 10.
U.N. Charter art. 24.
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5th Sess. Rep. on the Informal Inter‐Sessional Meeting, supra note 42, ¶ 55.
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Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 163 (July
20) (holding that “[t]he primary responsibility is conferred upon the Security Council”
under Article 24, and further, with reference to Article 14 of the U.N. Charter, “that the
General Assembly is also to be concerned with international peace and security”).
164
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 1984 I.C.J. 392, ¶ 95 (Nov. 26).
165
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 146–47 (June 27); see also Armed Activities on the Territory of
the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 168, 280 (Dec. 19)
(“[T]he Republic of Uganda . . . violated the principle of non‐use of force in international
relations and the principle of non‐intervention.”).
166
ICC, Non‐paper by the Chairman on Outstanding Issues Regarding the Conditions for
the Exercise of Jurisdiction, Assembly of States Parties, Resumed 8th Sess., Mar. 22–25,
2010, app. I, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. ICC‐ASP/8/20/Add.1, Annex II (2010).
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an exclusive (internal) filter.167 This did not exclude a role for the Security
Council.168 Besides requiring that the Security Council make a determination of
an act of aggression before the ICC Prosecutor can commence an investigation
into the crime of aggression, there also remained substantial support for the so‐
called “green light option” included in a proposal referred to by the Special
Working Group on the Crime of Aggression in its report of January, 2007 and
which meant in essence that the Security Council could allow the ICC to proceed
with a case without making a determination that an act of aggression had
occurred.169
A non‐paper of the Chair of the Special Working Group on the Crime of
Aggression, annexed to the Report of the Working Group on the Review
Conference and adopted by the Eighth Session of the Assembly of States Parties
(March 22–25, 2010), summarized as follows the options that remained in
dispute in the present context on the eve of the Review Conference:
(a) If the Prosecutor finds on the available evidence that a “reasonable
basis” exists to proceed with an investigation in respect of a crime of
aggression, he must first inform the Secretary‐General of the United
Nations of that fact, thereby giving the Security Council an
opportunity to make a determination of an act of aggression.170
Should the Security Council make such a determination, the
Prosecutor can proceed with the investigation.171
(b) If the Security Council has not made such a determination, two
alternative views remained in contention:
167
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Alternative 1: The Prosecutor can only proceed with an
investigation if the Security Council has determined that an act of
aggression has taken place (Option 1), or the Prosecutor can only
proceed with an investigation if the Security Council has
authorized the investigation by giving the ICC a procedural “green
light” (Option 2).172
Alternative 2: Absence of a determination by the Security Council
will not preclude the ICC from exercising jurisdiction, either
because no filter is required (Option 1), or the ICC’s own internal
filter would apply (a determination of an act of aggression by a
Pre‐Trial Chamber) (Option 2), or the General Assembly of the
United Nations has decided that an act of aggression has been
committed (Option 3), or the ICJ has decided that an act of
aggression has been committed (Option 4).173
A roll call revealed that stubborn support remained for Alternative 1,
Option 1, though a vast majority of delegations preferred Alternative 2, with
increasing support for Alternative 2, Option 2.174
In a Draft Report of the Working Group on the Crime of Aggression
submitted to the Review Conference at the end of its first week of deliberations,
it was recorded that “[s]ome delegations reiterated their preference for
Alternative 1,” either as reflected in Option 1 (where the Security Council has
made a determination of an act of aggression), or in Option 2 (where the
Security Council has requested the Prosecutor to proceed with an investigation
in respect of a crime of aggression).175 The Working Group noted that support
for this alternative was based on the assumption that Article 39 of the U.N.
Charter afforded to the Security Council exclusive competence to determine that
an act of aggression has been committed and that Article 5(2) of the ICC Statute
required that amendments of the Statute relating to the crime of aggression
must be “consistent with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United
Nations.”176 The Draft Report went on to note support by other delegations for
Alternative 2, which affords to the Prosecutor the power to proceed with an
investigation in the absence of a Security Council determination; and within the
172
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ranks of those delegations, “[s]trong support” emerged for Option 2, which gives
the role of jurisdictional filter to a Pre‐Trial Chamber of the ICC.177 Proponents of
this position emphasized the need for the ICC to act independently;178 and in
order to garnish further support for an exclusive Pre‐Trial Chamber filter, some
delegations, including the one of Germany, proposed that a determination of an
act of aggression by the Pre‐Trial Chamber should perhaps require a unanimous
decision.179
Although some delegations still expressed support for the General
Assembly or the ICJ to act as a jurisdictional filter (for example Nigeria and New
Zealand, respectively), those options were deleted from subsequent drafts.180
And although overwhelming support emerged for Alternative 2, France in the
second week of the Review Conference, at a time when all other delegations
emphasized the need for compromises to be made, stated quite bluntly that it
would under no circumstances agree to a proposal that would not recognize the
Security Council as the sole jurisdictional filter.181
In its final report to the Assembly of States Parties, the Special Working
Group recorded the fact that different opinions still prevailed as to how the ICC
should proceed in cases where the Security Council had not made a
determination of an act of aggression, but noted that “most delegations . . .
preferred that such a decision [should] rest with the Court itself, for example
with the Pre‐Trial Chamber.”182 An earlier Conference Room Paper proposed the
addition to the ICC Statute of two distinct articles dealing separately with the
exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in the case of State Party
referrals and proprio motu investigations by the Prosecutor (Article 15bis), and in
the case of Security Council referrals (Article 15ter).183
177
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B. Exercise of Jurisdiction over the Crime of Aggression
The proposed Article 15bis deals with the competence of the Prosecutor
to conduct an investigation into the crime of aggression following a State Party
referral, or upon his or her own decision to conduct an investigation proprio
motu.184 The substance of the proposed Article was for the most part acceptable
by general agreement: If the Prosecutor has concluded that a reasonable basis
exists for him or her to proceed with an investigation in respect of the crime of
aggression, he or she must before anything else ascertain whether the Security
Council has made a determination of an act of aggression by the State
concerned.185 To this end, the Prosecutor is required to notify the Secretary‐
General of the United Nations of the situation under consideration and to
provide the Secretary‐General with the information and documents at his or her
disposal relating to that situation.186 If the Security Council “has made such a
determination,” the Prosecutor may without further ado proceed with the
investigation in respect of the crime of aggression.187
But what if the Security Council has not made a determination that an act
of aggression has been committed by the State concerned? Here, consensus
could not be reached in the Working Group, and two alternative points of view
remained in contention. Some delegations maintained that the Prosecutor may
then not proceed with the investigation (Alternative 1),188 while others persisted
that if no such determination has been made within a certain period of time, and
most delegations in this category seemed to settle for a period of six months, the
Prosecutor can proceed with the investigation following authorization by a Pre‐
Trial Chamber of the ICC for him or her to proceed (Alternative 2).189 The
procedure to be followed by the Prosecutor under Alternative 2 is the one
prescribed in Article 15 of the ICC Statute for investigations by the Prosecutor
proprio motu.190
In the final week of the Review Conference, Argentina, Brazil and
Switzerland submitted a non‐paper that “builds on the Chairman’s Conference
Argentina, Brazil and Switzerland as of 6 June 2010 (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with the author) (differentiating in distinct articles between prosecutions of the crime of
aggression based on State Party referrals and proprio motu investigations by the
Prosecutor on the one hand, and based on Security Council referrals on the other).
184
Conference Room Paper on the Crime of Aggression, supra note 183, ¶ 3, art. 15bis.
185
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190
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15bis(4)(Alternative 2).
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Room paper of 5 June 2010” and which in essence laid the foundation for and
acceptance of Alternative 2, including a six months period within which the
Security Council is required to make a determination before the Prosecutor can
proceed with an investigation based on a Pre‐Trial Chamber authorization for
him to proceed.191 Shortly thereafter, Canada also submitted a proposal,
“intended as contributing toward an eventual compromise package,” based
upon, but which deviated somewhat from, the provisions of Alternative 2.192 It
required, in addition to the Pre‐Trail Chamber filter, that either all States
concerned with the alleged crime of aggression, or alternatively, the State on
whose territory the alleged crime of aggression occurred and the State of
nationality of the person accused of the crime, have accepted the competence of
the Prosecutor to proceed with an investigation in the circumstances stipulated
in the current paragraph.193 A Non‐Paper submitted by Slovenia on June 8, 2010
sought to combine the compromise proposals of Argentina/Brazil/Switzerland
and of Canada.194 The Slovenian Non‐Paper also preferred a Pre‐Trial Chamber
filter in cases where the Security Council has not within a period of six months
made a determination of an act of aggression, but added to that a further
condition for the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC over the crime requiring that
all States Parties involved in the alleged crime of aggression must have ratified or
accepted the amendment of the ICC Statute relating to the crime of
aggression.195
Other provisions included in the proposed Article 15bis were
uncontroversial: A determination of an act of aggression by an organ outside the
ICC is not binding on the Court;196 that is to say, for example, that if the Security
Council has decided that an act of aggression has been committed, the ICC must
of its own accord decide whether or not that is indeed the case. The proposed
Article 15bis furthermore proclaims that its provisions apply to the crime of
aggression only and not to investigations into other crimes within the subject‐
matter jurisdiction of the ICC.197
The proposed Article 15ter applies exclusively to the exercise of
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression under the rubric of a Security Council
referral, and its provisions were accepted in the Working Group by general
191
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agreement.198 It provides in essence that a determination of an act of aggression
by the Security Council serves as authorization for the Prosecutor to proceed
with an investigation into the crime of aggression;199 and conversely, that in the
absence of such a determination, the Prosecutor may not proceed with an
investigation into the crime of aggression.200 One must bear in mind that a
determination of an act of aggression as such by the Security Council will not
trigger the competence of the Prosecutor to conduct an investigation within the
confines of Article 15ter; the Security Council must, in addition to a
determination of an act of aggression, refer the situation to the ICC for
investigation by its Prosecutor in accordance with Article 13(b) of the ICC
Statute.201
Other provisions in the proposed Article 15ter are essentially similar to
corresponding sections in Article 15bis: if the Prosecutor has established a
reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation in respect of the crime of
aggression, he must first establish whether the Security Council has made a
determination of an act of aggression by the State concerned, and must notify
the Secretary‐General of the United Nations of the situation under consideration
and provide the Secretary‐General with the information and documents at his or
her disposal;202 a determination of an act of aggression by an organ outside the
ICC is not binding on the Court;203 and the provisions of Article 15bis apply to the
crime of aggression only and not to investigations into other crimes within the
subject‐matter jurisdiction of the ICC.204
C. Ratifications and Entering into Force of the Crime of Aggression
Article 5(2) of the ICC Statute requires that the definition of the crime of
aggression and a provision setting out the conditions under which the ICC can
exercise jurisdiction with respect to that crime must be adopted in accordance
with Articles 121 and 123 of the ICC Statute.205 Article 123 makes provision for a
198
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Review Conference to be held “[s]even years after the entry into force of the
Statute,”206 and stipulates that the adoption and entry into force of any
amendments of the ICC Statute are governed by Article 121(3) to (7).207 In terms
of Article 121(3), “[t]he adoption of amendments at . . . a Review Conference on
which consensus cannot be reached shall require a two‐thirds majority of States
Parties.”208 Article 121(4) provides that “an amendment shall enter into force for
all States Parties one year after instruments of ratification or acceptance have
been deposited with the Secretary‐General of the United Nations by seven‐
eighths of them.”209 Article 121(5) provides in part:
Any amendment to article[s] 5 . . . of this Statute shall enter into force for
those States Parties which have accepted the amendment one year after
the deposit of their instruments of ratification or acceptance. In respect of a
State Party which has not accepted the amendment, the Court shall not
exercise its jurisdiction regarding a crime covered by the amendment when
committed by that State Party’s Nationals or on its territory.210

Article 121(6) makes provisions for States Parties that have not accepted
an amendment of the ICC Statute to withdraw from the ICC with immediate
effect, subject though to an obligation of the State Party concerned to honor
obligations that arose while it still was a State Party.211 Article 121(7) places an
obligation on the Secretary‐General of the United Nations to inform all States
Parties of amendments adopted at the Review Conference.212
The interpretation of these provisions in the Special Working Group on
the Crime of Aggression and by the Review Conference was fraught with many
difficulties. Some delegations emphasized the different rules attending the
entering into force of “amendments” of the ICC Statute under Article 121(4) and
121(5) respectively.213 Amendments governed by Article 121(4) enter into force
“for all States Parties” one year after seven‐eighths of States Parties have
deposited instruments of ratification or acceptance with the Secretary‐General
of the United Nations, and will thus also be binding on States that have not
ratified the amendment.214 Amendments falling under Article 121(5) only
206
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become binding on “States Parties which have accepted the amendment” one
year after those State Parties have deposited their instruments of ratification or
acceptance with the Secretary‐General.215 Here, the seven‐eighths requirement
does not apply; the amendment becomes binding on every State Party that has
ratified or accepted the amendment irrespective of the total number of
ratifications.216 The key question is, therefore, whether a definition of the crime
of aggression and a decision specifying the circumstances under which the ICC
can exercise jurisdiction over that crime is governed by Article 121(4) or 121(5).
Article 121(5) applies to amendments of the subject‐matter jurisdiction
of the ICC (Articles 5, 6, 7 and 8), while Article 121(4) applies to other
amendments of the ICC Statute.217 Since Article 5 already included the crime of
aggression in the subject‐matter jurisdiction of the ICC,218 can it truly be said that
the Review Conference in defining the crime of aggression and in laying down
the conditions under which the ICC can exercise jurisdiction with respect to that
crime would amount to an amendment of the ICC Statute within the meaning of
Article 121(5)? Roger Clark, an advisor to the delegation of Samoa, in arguing
that Article 121(4) is the one to be applied, laid special stress on the wording of
Article 5(2), requiring for the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC over the crime of
aggression that “a provision is adopted” defining the crime and setting out the
conditions under which the ICC can exercise jurisdiction over that crime:
“Amendment” normally implies that something is being changed or
altered. One could contend strongly that it is not necessary to change
the wording of Article 5 in order to fulfil the expectations of the
drafters. Article 5(2) . . . is arguably an example of a facilitative or
enabling provision which is a condition to be met, rather than an
219
obstacle that needs to be changed.

One need not dwell upon the provisions regulating the adoption of
amendments of the ICC Statute and their application to the crime of aggression
because the definition of the crime of aggression, as well as the conditions under
which the ICC can exercise jurisdiction in the future with respect to that crime
and all other concomitant amendments of the ICC Statute, were adopted in the
215
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closing hours of the Review Conference by general agreement.220 The two‐thirds
majority alternative laid down in Article 121(3) was therefore never in issue.
More complicated, though, were deliberations on the entry into force of
the amended text of the ICC Statute. Two issues remained in contention almost
right to the end: will the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC be dependent on
acceptance of the amendments relating to the crime of aggression by the culprit
State; and when exactly will the power of the ICC to prosecute the crime of
aggression take effect?221
The debate as to the first of these two highly controversial matters was
almost entirely focused on what commonly came to be referred to as “the
second sentence of Article 121, paragraph 5.”222 That sentence reads as follows:
In respect of a State Party which has not accepted the amendment, the
Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction regarding a crime covered by the
amendment when committed by that State Party’s nationals or on its
territory.223

In the course of the proceedings, two distinct interpretations of the
second sentence of Article 121, paragraph 5, “a negative and a positive
interpretation,” came onto the agenda.224
The negative interpretation of the second sentence of Article 121(5)
would have it that the ICC cannot exercise jurisdiction with respect to the crime
of aggression committed by nationals or on the territory of a State Party that has
not accepted the amendments of the ICC Statute relating to the crime of
aggression.225 The negative interpretation therefore makes the exercise of
jurisdiction by the ICC conditional upon acceptance of the amendments by the
culprit State.226
The positive interpretation of the second sentence of Article 121(5)
affords to the ICC jurisdiction to prosecute the crime of aggression committed by
a national or on the territory of a State Party that has accepted the amendments
of the ICC Statute relating to the crime of aggression (the victim State).227 The
reasoning of the “positivists” basically proclaimed that a provision requiring that
220
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the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction regarding a crime of aggression
committed by the nationals or on the territory of a State Party that has not
accepted the relevant amendments of the ICC Statute means, ex contrario, that
the Court can exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression when committed
by the nationals or on the territory of a State Party that has accepted those
amendments.228 The positive interpretation therefore does not make the
exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC conditional upon acceptance of the
amendments by the culprit State, provided only that the victim State has
accepted the amendments.229 Some delegations, including the one of Sweden,
noted that the positive interpretation does justice to the basic international‐law
principle of reciprocity, in terms of which a State (in casu the culprit State)
should not be allowed to refer a situation to the ICC unless that State is also
subject to the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC.230
The negative interpretation found favor with most European countries,
with some exceptions, though, which included Greece and Switzerland.231
African, Latin American and Caribbean countries by and large considered
acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction by the culprit State unacceptable and
consequently preferred the positive interpretation.232
Entry into force of the provisions amending the ICC Statute with respect
to the crime of aggression was equally controversial. There seemed to be wide
support for a “menu approach” that distinguished the entering into force of the
competence of the ICC to exercise jurisdiction in the event of Security Council
referrals on the one hand, and State Party referrals and investigations conducted
by the Prosecutor proprio motu on the other.233
Some delegations supported the application of the first sentence of
Article 121, paragraph 5 to the entering into force of the definition of the crime
of aggression and of prosecutions in the ICC based on Security Council referrals;
i.e. the amendments should for these purposes “enter into force for those States
Parties which have accepted the amendment[s] one year after the deposit of
their instruments of ratification or acceptance.”234 The competence of ICC to
exercise jurisdiction based on a Security Council referral would thus, under this
option, commence one year after the very first instrument of ratification or
acceptance has been deposited by a State Party with the Secretary‐General of
228
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the United Nations.235 Since the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC in cases of
Security Council referrals is not confined to the jurisdictional principle of
territoriality or active personality but is on the contrary a matter of universal
jurisdiction, the ICC can then prosecute any crime of aggression that comes
within the confines of the Security Council referral irrespective of acceptance of
the concerned amendments by the State of nationality of the perpetrator or the
territorial State, provided though that the underlying act of aggression has been
established by the appropriate filter.236 Several delegations maintained that the
filter in this instance must be confined to the Security Council itself.237
The entry into force of the amendments for purposes of prosecutions
based on State Party referrals or investigations by the Prosecutor proprio motu
will, on the contrary, be governed by the provisions of Article 121, paragraph 4;
that is to say the amendments “shall enter into force for all States Parties one
year after instruments of ratification or acceptance have been deposited with
the Secretary‐General of the United Nations by seven‐eighths of them.”238
The compromise reflected in the final decision of the Review Conference
relating to the entry into force of the aggression‐related amendments of the ICC
Statute did not, in the end, distinguish between the different trigger
mechanisms. The entry into force dispute was laid to rest by identical provisions
applying to the two categories of trigger mechanisms that postponed the
competence of the ICC to prosecute the crime of aggression until a future
date.239 In the case of Security Council referrals, as well as State Party referrals
and investigations proprio motu, the Court may only exercise jurisdiction over
the crime of aggression “committed one year after the ratification of the
amendment by thirty States Parties.”240
This provision clearly deviates from the decree in Article 121(4) of the ICC
Statute making the entry into force of amendments to the Statute dependent on
ratification of those amendments by seven‐eighths (at the time of the Review
Conference, 97 of the 111) States Parties.241 The Working Group on the Crime of
Aggression had noted in its final report to the Assembly of States Parties that the
entry into force provisions of the ICC Statute alluded to earlier “seemed to be
235
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ambiguous and not to apply well to the crime of aggression.”242 Those provisions
therefore required what some delegations referred to as “creative
interpretations.”243 It is perhaps worth noting that several delegations, including
those of China, Denmark and Japan, warned against too much creativity in the
application of the ICC Statute.244 Japan noted, with reference to Article 31 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, that the ICC Statute should first and
foremost be interpreted “in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning
to be given to the terms of the treaty and in light of its object and purpose.”245
Several delegations, including those of Japan and the Russian Federation,
warned that the Review Conference cannot go against the provisions of Article
121 without formally amending that Article.246 Samoa, on the other hand,
maintained that the entry into force provisions of the ICC Statute can be
amended implicitly through decisions taken by the Review Conference.247
Amendment by implication of the ICC Statute seemingly became a reality as far
as the entry‐into‐force arrangement of prosecutions of the crime of aggression is
concerned.248 However, the actual implementation of the 30 States Parties
requirement was made conditional on confirmation thereof at a later date.249
Proposals had been made to delay the de facto exercise of jurisdiction by
the ICC over the crime of aggression to “help allay fears that the Court may be
too young to exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression.”250 Delegations
that supported a delayed entry into force included the one of Austria.251 This
rather distrustful assessment of the capabilities of (judges of) the ICC was upheld
by the Review Conference in its final decision on the circumstances under which
the Court will be competent to exercise jurisdiction in regard to the crime of
aggression.252 It was decided, by general agreement, to postpone the
competence of the Court to exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression for
a period of seven years, and to make the competence of the Court to do so after
the lapse of seven years dependent on a decision of States Parties required for
242
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the amendment of the ICC Statute (consensus, or a two‐thirds majority of all
States Parties).253
The requirement that at least 30 States must have ratified the
amendments relating to aggression before the ICC can exercise jurisdiction over
that crime, and that the competence of the ICC to exercise jurisdiction over the
crime of aggression will be reconsidered after the lapse of close to seven years
as from the Kampala Review Conference (January 1, 2017), apply to all such
prosecution irrespective of the trigger mechanism that set proceedings in
motion.254 The United States, among others, argued in favor of making no
distinction in this regard between Security Council referrals and other trigger
mechanisms.255
However, an Understanding added to the amended text of the ICC
Statute relating to jurisdiction ratione temporis in respect of the crime of
aggression does again distinguish between State Party referrals and proprio
motu investigations on the one hand, and Security Council referral on the other.
It provides that in the case of State Party referrals and investigations conducted
by the Prosecutor proprio motu, the Court may only exercise jurisdiction with
respect to crimes of aggression committed after a decision has been taken to
implement the amendments decided upon by the Review Conference (that is,
after January 1, 2017), or one year after ratification or acceptance of the
amendments by 30 States Parties, whichever is the later of these two dates.256
This seems to mean that, following a Security Council referral and provided
implementation of the amendments has been sanctioned by the post‐January 1,
2017 meeting, the ICC can prosecute crimes of aggression that have been
committed one year after 30 States Parties have ratified or accepted the
amendments even if the crimes were committed prior to the post‐January 1,
2017 decision to implement the amendments.
D. Opting Out Provisions
A distinction between prosecutions based on a Security Council referral
on the one hand, and those based on a State Party referral and investigations
proprio motu on the other, was also retained in one further important respect:
The right of a State Party not to accept the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC
over crimes of aggression arising from an act of aggression committed by that
State Party.257 This opt‐out provision applies to prosecutions deriving from State
253
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Party referrals and investigations proprio motu only.258 The State Party can lodge
the opt‐out declaration with the Registrar of the ICC at any time, but for the
declaration to be effective, it must precede the act of aggression from which an
investigation into the crime of aggression emerged.259 A State Party can
withdraw the opt‐out declaration at any time and must reconsider its declaration
within three years.260
A pertinent question in this regard is whether the opt‐out provision was
at all necessary. Under the provisions of Article 121(5), a State Party can exclude
the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC over crimes of aggression committed on
their territory or by their national by simply not accepting the amendment.261 It
sounded quite ludicrous to afford to States Parties the power to ratify the
concerned amendments (opting in) and at the same time decline to accept the
exercise of jurisdiction in respect of crimes of aggression committed on their
territory or by any of their nationals (opting out). However, given the fact that
one is here dealing with decisions of the ICC over political matters and
uncertainties as to the applicability of the consensual basis upon which the
exercise of jurisdiction by an international tribunals over acts of states depends,
the Review Conference decided to remain on the safe side by adding the opt‐out
arrangement.
For present purposes it will suffice to note that the opt‐out provision is
seemingly in conflict with the provision in the ICC Statute that precludes States
from ratifying the Statute subject to reservations,262 but was supported by
delegations that emphasized the unique political dimension of the crime of
aggression.263 It was based on a compromise proposal submitted by Canada
during the second week of the Review Conference.264
Differentiating between prosecutions based on Security Council referrals
on the one hand, and on State Party referrals and investigations proprio motu on
the other, also prevailed in respect of prosecutions in the ICC of crimes of
258
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aggression allegedly committed by nationals or on the territory of a non‐party
States. The ICC cannot on the basis of State Party referrals or investigations
proprio motu prosecute crimes of aggression allegedly committed by nationals or
on the territory of a non‐party State.265 This impediment does not apply to
prosecutions based on Security Council referrals.266
V. THE FINAL OUTCOME
These, then, are the provisions that were finally inserted in the ICC
Statute to regulate the conditions under which the ICC can exercise jurisdiction
over the crime of aggression:
Article 15 bis
Exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression
(State referral, proprio motu)
1. The Court may exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in
accordance with article 13, paragraph (a) and (c), subject to the
provisions of this article.
2.

The Court may exercise jurisdiction only with respect to crimes of
aggression committed one year after the ratification or acceptance
of the amendments by thirty States Parties.

3.

The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in
accordance with this article, subject to a decision to be taken after 1
January 2017 by the same majority of States Parties as is required
for the adoption of an amendment to this Statute.

4. The Court may, in accordance with article 12, exercise jurisdiction
over a crime of aggression, arising from an act of aggression
committed by a State Party, unless that State Party has previously
declared that it does not accept such jurisdiction by lodging a
declaration with the Registrar. The withdrawal of the declaration
may be effected at any time and shall be considered by the State
Party within three years.
5. In respect of a State that is not a party to this Statute, the Court shall
not exercise its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression when
committed by that State’s nationals or on its territory.
6. Where the Prosecutor concludes that there is a reasonable basis to
proceed with an investigation in respect of the crime of aggression,
265
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See id. art. 15ter (failing to apply the jurisdictional impedement in article 15bis to
article 15ter, which deals with the Security Council referrals).
266

2010–2011] Prosecuting the Crime of Aggression
he or she shall first ascertain whether the Security Council has made
a determination of an act of aggression committed by the State
concerned. The Prosecutor shall notify the Secretary‐General of the
United Nations of the situation before the Court, including any
relevant information and documents.
7. Where the Security Council has made a determination, the
Prosecutor may proceed with the investigation in respect of the
crime of aggression.
8. Where no determination is made within six months after the date of
notification, the Prosecutor may proceed with the investigation in
respect of the crime of aggression, provided a Pre‐Trial Division has
authorized the commencement of the investigation in respect of the
crime of aggression in accordance with the procedure contained in
article 15, and the Security Council has not decided otherwise in
accordance with Article 16.
9. A determination of an act of aggression by an organ outside the
Court shall be without prejudice to the Court’s own finding under
this Statute.
10. This article is without prejudice to the provisions relating to the
exercise of jurisdiction with respect to other crimes referred to in
article 5.
Article 15ter
Exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression
(Security Council referral)
1. The Court may exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in
accordance with article 13, paragraph (b), subject to the provisions
of this article.
2. The Court may exercise jurisdiction only with respect to crimes of
aggression committed one year after the ratification or acceptance
of the amendments by thirty States Parties.
3. The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in
accordance with this article, subject to a decision to be taken after 1
January 2017 by the same majority of States Parties as is required
by the adoption of an amendment to this Statute.
4. A determination of an act of aggression by an organ outside the
Court shall be without prejudice to the Court’s own finding under
this Statute.
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5. This article is without prejudice to the provisions relating to the
exercise of jurisdiction with respect to other crimes referred to in
article 5.

Several other additions had to be made to the ICC Statute to
accommodate inclusion of the competence of the ICC to prosecute crimes of
aggression in the Statute.
Article 9, dealing with Elements of Crimes, had to be amended to include
a reference to the Elements of Crimes applying to the crime of aggression and
now provides in its introductory paragraph: “Elements of Crimes shall assist the
Court in the interpretation and application of articles 6, 7, 8 and 8bis.”267 Article
8bis defines the crime of aggression.
Article 20, proclaiming the principle of ne bis in idem had to be amended
to make the rule against double jeopardy also applicable to the crime of
aggression. The relevant subsection of that Article now provides in its
introductory passage: “No person who has been tried by another court of
conduct also proscribed under article 6, 7, 8 or 8bis shall be tried by the Court
with respect to the same conduct unless the proceedings in the other court:
268

…”

It should be noted, though, that an Understanding was added to the
definition of the crime of aggression that deviates from the principle of
complementarity, which affords to national States the prior right and obligation
to prosecute the crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC.269 The Understanding
provides: “It is understood that the amendments shall not be interpreted as
creating the right or obligation to exercise domestic jurisdiction with respect to
an act of aggression committed by another State.”270 This understanding was
inserted to address a concern of the United States, which was articulated as
follows by Prof. Harold Koh:
Too little attention has yet been paid to the question of how, if at all,
the principle of complementarity would apply to the crime of
aggression. The definition does little to limit the risk that State Parties
will incorporate a definition—particularly one we believe is flawed—
into their domestic law, encouraging the possibility that under
expansive principles of jurisdiction, government officials will be
prosecuted for alleged aggression in the courts of another state. Even if
267
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states incorporate an acceptable definition into their domestic law, it is
not clear whether or when it is appropriate for one state to bring its
neighbor’s leaders before its domestic courts for the crime of
aggression. Such domestic prosecutions would not be subject to any of
the filters under consideration here, and would ask the domestic courts
of one country to sit in judgment upon the state acts of other countries
271
in a manner highly unlikely to promote peace and security.

And just as an aside: The principle of complementarity was not intended
to afford a prior right to prosecute to States whose interest in the matter is
merely confined to the exercise of universal jurisdiction;272 and although a
person in authority cannot in virtue of their office avoid prosecutions in
international criminal tribunals, sovereign immunities do remain intact in
prosecutions in the courts of States other than their own.273
A further Understanding was added to the amendments of the ICC
Statute to reiterate, with reference to Article 10 of the ICC Statute, that those
amendments must “not be interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any way
existing or developing rules of international law for purposes other than this
Statute.”274
In summary, the following rules prevailed:
Entry into force of amendments to the ICC Statute pertinent to the crime
of aggression is delayed until, at the earliest, January 1, 2017. Subsequent to
that date, the Assembly of States Parties can decide to implement the
competence of the ICC to prosecute the crime of aggression. A decision to
implement the competence of the ICC to prosecute the crime of aggression must
preferably be taken by consensus, but if consensus cannot be reached, then by a
two‐thirds majority of all States Parties.275 The two‐thirds majority is to be
calculated with a view to the number of States Parties at the time the decision is
taken. Exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC over the crime of aggression further
requires that at least 30 States Parties have ratified or accepted the
amendments to the ICC Statute pertinent to the crime of aggression. The
competence of the ICC to prosecute the crime of aggression will take effect one
271
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year after ratification or acceptance of those amendments by the 30th State
Party. If after January 1, 2017 the Assembly of States Parties decide to activate
the competence of the ICC to prosecute the crime of aggression, and at that time
one year has already expired after ratification of the amendments by 30 States
Parties, the ICC can immediately bring perpetrators of the crime of aggression to
justice,276 but subject to the following further constraints:
(a) If the situation has been referred to the ICC by the Security Council, the
ICC can proceed with an investigation provided:
(i)

The Security Council has referred the matter to the ICC;277

(ii)

The act of aggression was committed at the earliest one
year after 30 States Parties had ratified the amendments
to the ICC Statute pertinent to the crime of aggression;278

(iii)

It matters not whether the State that was found to have
committed an act of aggression has, or has not, ratified the
ICC Statute or has, or has not, accepted the amendments
incorporating into the ICC Statute the definition of the
crime of aggression and the circumstances under which
that crime can be prosecuted in the ICC.

It should be noted that Article 15ter does not expressly require the
Security Council to make a determination that an act of aggression has occurred.
It is submitted that referring the situation to the ICC and determining that an act
of aggression has been committed are two distinct modalities of proceedings in
the ICC and must not be confused with one another. The assumption that such a
determination is required may further be based on the definition of the crime of
aggression, which makes prosecution of the crime of aggression dependent on
the commission of an act of aggression. It is also reasonable to assume that the
Security Council will not refer a situation that might involve a crime of aggression
to the ICC unless it has determined that an act of aggression has occurred. And
finally, the section of Article 15ter providing that [a] determination of an act of
aggression by an organ outside the ICC shall be without prejudice to the Courts
own findings under this Statute clearly suggests that such a determination will be
276
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forthcoming from an organ outside the ICC, in this instance the Security Council.
This latter provision may prove to be problematic in the following
respects: It clearly suggests that, following a determination of an act of
aggression by the Security Council, (a Pre‐Trial Chamber of) the ICC can decide
that an act of aggression has in fact not been committed. Does it also mean that
(a Pre‐Trial Chamber of) the ICC can decide that an act of aggression has been
committed in cases where the Security Council has decided that this was not the
case?
(b) If an investigation into an alleged crime of aggression derives from a State
Party referral or is to be conducted by the Prosecutor proprio motu, the ICC
can proceed with an investigation subject to the following rules of law:

279
280

(i)

If the Security Council has determined that an act of aggression
has occurred, the Prosecutor can proceed with an
investigation into crimes of aggression emanating from that
act of aggression, unless (i) the crime of aggression was
allegedly committed by a national or on the territory of a State
which is not a State Party to the ICC Statute, or (ii) the State
that committed the act of aggression is a State Party to the ICC
Statute but has previously (before the Security Council
determination) lodged a declaration with the Registrar of the
ICC stating that it does not accept the exercise of jurisdiction
by the ICC over the crime of aggression;279

(ii)

If within six months of having been invited by the Prosecutor
to consider the matter, the Security Council has not made a
determination that an act of aggression has occurred, the
Prosecutor can proceed with an investigation into a crime of
aggression, subject to the proceedings governing
investigations proprio motu, provided a Pre‐Trial Chamber of
the ICC has authorized the commencement of the
investigation, but again subject to the condition (i) that the
crime of aggression was not committed on the territory or by
a national of a State that is not a State Party to the ICC
Statute, and (ii) the State that committed the act of aggression
has not previously (before the Pre‐Trial authorization) lodged
a declaration with the Registrar of the ICC stating that it does
not accept the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC over the
crime of aggression.280
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Reference is also made in the applicable Article 15bis to Article 16 of the
ICC Statute, which authorizes the Security Council in a resolution adopted under
its Chapter VII powers, to call for the suspension of proceedings in the ICC for a
renewable period of 12 months.281 It is important to recall that Article 16 can
only be applied to delay, and not to terminate, an investigation or prosecution,
that it was intended to avoid a conflict of interests between the Security Council
and the ICC, and that it should only be applied if the Security Council is seized
with the situation under investigation under its powers to deal with a threat to
the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression.282
VI. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
In a sense, the final outcome of the Review Conference was a great
disappointment, especially in virtue of the fact that implementation of the
provisions agreed upon has been put on hold for approximately seven years and
must then, subsequent to January 1, 2017, be reconsidered by perhaps a Review
Conference and approved by at least a two‐thirds majority of States Parties.
Excluding the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC in respect of crimes of aggression
emanating from acts of aggression committed by non‐party States (except in
virtue of a Security Council referral) also deviates from general principles
endorsed by the ICC Statute in the case of other crimes. If a national of a non‐
party State were to commit a crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC on the
territory of a State Party, that person can be brought to trial in the ICC pursuant
to a State Party referral or following an investigation by the Prosecutor proprio
motu but not if the offence happens to be the crime of aggression. And what is
more, States Parties have been afforded the right to exclude the jurisdiction of
the ICC, absent a Security Council referral, for crimes of aggression emanating
from an act of aggression committed by that State Party!
In the end, though, the outcome of the Review Conference was perhaps
commendable. It has been emphasized by several delegations that the crime of
aggression is quite unique since it always involves acts of state that constitute a
violation of customary international law.283 Political acts and decisions are
therefore a conspicuous element of the crime of aggression. As noted in the
Review Conference by a delegate of the Russian Federation, aggression is for
that reason a highly politicized crime.284 It is perhaps true that prosecutions
281
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based on acts of aggression “are controversial precisely because the use of force
in international relations remains a sovereign prerogative the sovereigns are
understandably unwilling to disavow entirely, and because of the structurally
decentralized and morally heterogeneous nature of international society.”285
Gerry Simpson predicted for that reason that “as a legal category, it is more
likely that aggression will be consigned to the class of a ‘crime to come’ because
it can neither be defined and applied universally … nor removed altogether from
the international agenda.”286 It is also our assessment that there will perhaps in
the foreseeable future never be any prosecutions in the ICC for the crime of
aggression, and to let the possibility of such prosecutions stand in the way of
universality is perhaps in the final analysis not warranted.
Particularly praiseworthy is the fact that the Review Conference, building
on years of deliberations, consensus seeking, and compromises, succeeded,
beyond all expectations,287 to reach general agreement on all, extremely
controversial, issues at stake. Flexibility in the event of State Party referrals and
investigations proprio motu was inspired by the overarching objective of
universal support for the ICC. All the Super Powers, and many other delegations,
were never at ease with jurisdiction of the ICC over the crime of aggression, and
by affording to States Parties the option to exclude the competence of the ICC to
prosecute crimes of aggression based on their own acts of aggression is perhaps
not conducive to the principle of equal justice but may promote ratification of
the ICC Statute by States that might have been reluctant to become parties to a
treaty that could implicate their own belligerent practices and policies.
Ambassador Stephen Rapp and Prof. Harold Koh could for example give
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assurances to (skeptics in) the Department of State that “the outcome [of the
Review Conference] protected our vital interests.”288
There is also the following positive potential of the final outcome. We do
now have an authoritative definition of the crime of aggression and
acknowledgment across the board that this definition reflects customary
international law. That in itself will most likely serve as a deterrent against
armed interventions, blockades, and support for unbecoming military actions by
trigger‐happy regimes.
And finally, much time has been devoted to the crime of aggression over
the last number of years. Having exposed of the matter at least for the next
seven years will enable the Assembly of States Parties to apply its mind to other
pressing issues.289
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